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How To Read, Or at Least Not Misread,
Cardozo in the Allegheny College Case
ALFRED

S.KONEFSKY*

Cardozo was a truly innovative judge of a type which had long since gone
out of fashion. In his opinions, however, he was accustomed to hide his
light under a bushel. The more innovative the decision to which he had
persuaded his brethren on the court, the more his opinion strained to prove
that no novelty-not the slightest departure from prior law-was involved.
Since Cardozo was one of the best case lawyers who ever lived, the proof
was invariably marshalled with a masterly elegance. It is not until the
reader gets to the occasional angry dissent that he realizes that Cardozo
had been turning the law of New York upside down. During his twenty
years Cardozo succeeded to an extraordinary degree in freeing up-and, of
course, unsettling-the law of New York. It is true that he went about
doing this in such an elliptical, convoluted, at times incomprehensible, fashion that the less gifted lower court New York judges were frequently at a
loss to understand what they were being told.
Grant Gilmore'
I.

N

INTRODUCTION

o judicial opinion of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo better illustrates

Grant Gilmore's observation than the Allegheny College case.2 It is,
at the very least, an example of the "elliptical, convoluted," and "at
times" also the "incomprehensible." 3 We might also add that it is frustrating, elusive, and occasionally impenetrable. In this essay, I offer hope.
I think I understand, in the face of confusion, what Cardozo set out to
accomplish in the eleven paragraphs of Allegheny College. Perhaps I too
have been misled. In any event, I will demonstrate what I think Cardozo
*

Professor, Law School, State University of New York at Buffalo. I would like to thank (1) a

decade or so of law students at Buffalo, who sat through a form of this lecture, helped to hone it, and
endured it, (2) Dianne Avery, David Engel, Jack Hyman, and Jack Schlegel, who read and commented on it, and may or may not have saved me from my errors, (3) Frank Herdman and Susan
Weber of the Buffalo Law Review, who actually encouraged writing this article and worked hard on
making it intelligible, and (4) Joyce Farrell, who helped make this both legible and presentable.
1. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (1977).

2. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173
(1927), cited in G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 135 n.18.
3. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 75.
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had in mind by organizing and writing the opinion in the manner he did.
And I am going to demonstrate his thought process by a somewhat novel
and untraditional technique-reading the opinion and offering my commentary on it, line by line, paragraph by paragraph.4 (For those who
would prefer to read the complete opinion, either before, during, or after
this exercise, the opinion has been added to the end of the essay as Appendix I.)
A.

UnderstandingCardozo

Why am I engaging in this quaint exercise in textual exegesis?' The
answer is simple-my Contracts students made me do it. Quite a few
years ago, I began to notice that, in addition to "the less gifted lower
court New York judges," first-year law students, perhaps only a month
or two into the formal study of the legal process, had barely a clue as to
what was going on in the Allegheny College opinion. This should not
have struck anyone as unusual, for as I will show shortly, some very
distinguished legal scholars have grappled with the opinion without appreciably better results. Since confusion was epidemic, one day I decided
not to tease out the mysteries of the case, but rather to read the opinion
carefully along with the students in order to help them understand its
meaning and purpose. Since Cardozo "was accustomed to hide his light
under a bushel," I saw no reason to use the socratic method to hide the
ball as well as "the light." Not surprisingly, the textual explication
turned into a lecture. Many students, presumably those who were not
bored, said they found it helpful. I offer it here in that spirit.
I am not certain what the relevance of the case is today. Why should
we study a sixty-year-old charitable subscription case, in which an elderly woman, Mary Yates Johnston, pledged to a college a sum of money
due thirty days after her death, paid part of it during her lifetime, and
then changed her mind and cancelled the rest of the pledge, thereby
bringing down an action for the unpaid funds on her estate? Should we
care how Cardozo applied consideration doctrine to determine whether
or not the pledge was enforceable? Doctrinally the case is a dead end in
4. We usually demand this only of students in their first year of law school, and we tell them
they need to read a case many times before they will really understand it. For Cardozo decisions, it
may take many years.
5. You will notice my analysis proceeds untouched by, and without a single nod in the direction
of, any modem debate on the subject of original texts and interpretivism. Will the law review make
me provide citations to this phenomenon? For a reasoned response, see Aside, Don't Cry Over Filled
Milk- The Neglected Footnote Three to Carolene Products (footnotes omitted), 136 U. PA. L. REv.
1553, 1558 (1988) ("Citation is the highest form of legal discourse.").
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the late twentieth century. Few are the occasions when these disputes are
likely to find their way into litigation, and even when litigated, section
90(2) of the Second Restatement 6 puts the problem to rest. Charitable
subscriptions are accepted as enforceable without requiring that the facts
fit within the parameters of promissory estoppel (or consideration for
that matter).7 Courts, I suppose, are free to disagree, but few will. So, the
case now rarely appears in Contracts casebooks, and when not reprinted,
it is rarely cited. Most books just ignore it.
Why then teach or study it? One reason appears to be that Allegheny
College helps introduce promissory estoppel historically, to show how it
began to find its way over time into a handful of discrete doctrinal areas
which were originally donative rather than commercial, such as family
transactions and charitable subscriptions.8 The case can also be treated as
an exercise, or a moment in the history of consideration doctrine in
which the traditional doctrine was expanded or reexamined. Cardozo
seemed to be moving along this doctrinal front as I will try to show below. Through the first paragraphs of the opinion, Cardozo sounds critical
of innovations in consideration doctrine. But his critique serves merely to
emphasize the malleability of the doctrine. Similarly, references to promissory estoppel are illustrations of that flexibility. Having deployed an
historical argument establishing that consideration is not as rigid a concept as it first appeared, Cardozo then proceeds to use traditional doctrinal language to arrive at a conclusion which further expands
consideration.
That leads to a second reason. Clearly, it is important to examine
the judicial process and to see how particularly gifted judges have dealt
with complicated doctrinal issues. Much has been said about the craft of
Cardozo's judging. 9 But Cardozo presents a problem. What exactly is his
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1979) reads: "A charitable subscription or
a marriage settlement is binding under subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action
or forbearance." For charitable subscription purposes, the requirement that the promise induced
action is unnecessary. Section 90(2) was added to the second Restatement. Obviously § 90(1) requires that a promise "which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
... does induce such action or forbearance." See also comment f and its illustrations.
7.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).

8. See, e.g., C. KNAPP & N. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 133-63 (2d ed. 1987).
9. For example, Soia Mentschikoff and Irwin Stotzky devoted about two hundred fifty pages of
The Theory and Craft ofAmerican Law to tracing a sequence of New York contract opinions on the
subject of indefiniteness, many of which Cardozo either participated in or authored. See S. MENTSCHIKOFF & I. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW 295-554 (1981). Part of the
point of their exercise was to expose the student "to the use of precedents by the skilled judge,
Benjamin Cardozo." Id. at xvii. Cardozo saw the problem this way:
The work of deciding cases goes on every day in hundreds of courts throughout the land.
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craft supposed to illuminate about the legal process, if "he was accus-

tomed to hide his light under the bushel"? I assume we are not applauding stealth, guile rather than craft, though the two can be conflated.

Arthur Corbin, consistent with Gilmore's insight, once said of Cardozo
that when he was "through, the law is not exactly as it was before; but

there has been no sudden shift or revolutionary change."' 10 Is craft inconsistent with doctrinal manipulation, or is it a craft of its own? Maybe the
craft is in moving things along within the framework of the system so

that hardly anyone notices or complains. I suppose that is an art form,
and art, needless to say, ought to be studied. To that end, however, it

might be useful to pin down precisely what Cardozo was up to in Allegheny College. In doing that work, and, for purposes of this essay, I am
not interested in whether Cardozo was a social engineer, antiformalist,

rationalist, humanist, moralist, Thomist, relativist, liberal, closet or
proto-realist (actually, I prefer to think of some of the legal realists and
their progeny as regal legalists), or whatever. (By the way, though he

seems to have rejected formalism, he was not above occasionally and silently using it to serve his own purposes.)" I am pretty sure he was not a
crit.
There is a third reason too. Maybe because I am at heart a social
historian of law (with a soft spot for legal doctrine, and particularly consideration doctrine), I just find studying the case fun.
Any judge, one might suppose, would find it easy to describe the process which he had
followed a thousand times and more. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Let some
intelligent layman ask him to explain: he will not go very far before taking refuge in the
excuse that the language of craftsmen is unintelligible to those untutored in the craft.
Such an excuse may cover with a semblance of respectability an otherwise ignominious
retreat.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9 (1921). See also Hamilton, Cardozo The
Craftsman, 6 U. CHl. L. REV. 1 (1938). For a critical view, see (Anon Y.) Mous, The Speech of
Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625 (1943).
10. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and The Law of Contracts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 57 (1939),
52 HARV. L. REV. 408, 409 (1939), 48 YALE L.J. 426, 427 (1939) (citations to this article will list
page numbers to each of these law reviews in the order shown here).
11. See infra text accompanying note 60 (Cardozo's arrayal of the principle of the adequacy of
consideration doctrine). For Cardozo's rejection of formalism, see Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff
Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917) ("The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal .... ); Jacob
& Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242-43, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921) ("Those who think more of
symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment
of a just result will be troubled by a classification where the lines of division are so wavering and
blurred.").
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B. Misreading Cardozo
The conceptual problem facing a judge deciding charitable subscription cases like Allegheny College in the mid-1920s was whether or not
consideration was present to support enforcement of the promise. Most
commentators have found, for better or worse, that Cardozo did manage
to fit this particular charitable subscription case within a somewhat "convoluted" consideration formula, and therefore enforced the promise.
Two examples will suffice. In the most recent edition of their contracts
casebook, Farnsworth and Young observe that "[i]t is also sometimes
possible to enforce such a promise by finding that the charity has done or
has promised to do something in exchange for the subscriber's promise.12 This "ground" of enforcement, they say, is found in the Allegheny
College case. 3 Grant Gilmore concluded that "Cardozo's opinion...
was essentially a demonstration of why the broad New York consideration theory made promissory estoppel an unnecessary and undesirable
refinement."' 4 There it is--promissory estoppel-the phrase sometimes
referred to as the "dictum" in the case. 5
A number of times in the course of the opinion Cardozo
invoked the
phrase promissory estoppel, thereby leading to a certain confusion as to
how exactly it was being used. The doctrinal question is whether or not
he was applying promissory estoppel, rather than consideration theory,
to enforce the promise. I will have more to say about that question when
I work my way through the opinion. But I think the answer is very
clear-Cardozo, having twice raised the issue of promissory estoppel,
dismissed it as a ground of decision. 6 Consideration doctrine, albeit expansively and flexibly applied, solved the enforceability problem for
Cardozo.
But that leaves us with a problem: how could an eminence such as
Arthur Corbin (not a first-year law student) have misread Cardozo so
thoroughly in the following manner?
The promise when first made was a promise of a gift for a specified
purpose and was not then binding. It was held that it became binding, in
accordance with the promissory estoppel doctrine, when the College received the part payment. Such receipt raised the implication of a promise to
12. E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CONTRACTS 98 (4th ed. 1988).
13. Id.
14. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 129 n.145 (1974).
15. E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, supra note 12, at 99; see also Note, Contract: Consideration
in Charitable Subscriptions, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 270, 272 (1928).
16. See 246 N.Y. at 373-75, 159 N.E. at 174-75; see also infra text accompanying notes 53-54,
69.
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use the fund as Mary had directed. It was by reason of this receipt and
implied promise that Mary became bound to pay the balance of her subscription. Thus the revocable promise of the subscriber was turned into an
contract by applying the supposed doctrine of promisenforceable bilateral
17
sory estoppel.

Assuming Farnsworth and Young, Gilmore, and others were correct (as
I think I will show they were), what was Corbin talking about? Is it
simply a flat misreading by Corbin, from which we should all take comfort as a sign of the fallibility of great persons? Maybe. It is peculiar that
no one even quotes Corbin's interpretation of Allegheny College. (It
seems a little like a deep, dark family secret-or at least, a minor eccentricity protected by the small circle of people who might have both
known and thought about the case, and were also aware Corbin had
something to say about it. Grant Gilmore, who had lots to say about
everything, never mentioned a word about Corbin's reading of the case,
even though he often relied on Corbin, including his unrecorded conversations with him.' 8 Gilmore could keep a secret.) What could Corbin
have meant? Or better put: What was Corbin up to? A number of readings are possible (and I do not mean to be exhaustive).
First, Corbin really did not understand the opinion, and he actually
misread it. This has a certain surface plausibility and appeal-great men
with feet of clay, or at least asleep at the switch. But Corbin had such a
terrific command of doctrine and the subtle sense of the manipulation of
legal rules that it is hard to believe he made a first-year law student's
mistake about the holding of a case.
Second, maybe Corbin preferred to think, for whatever reason, that
Cardozo was actually using promissory estoppel, even though Cardozo
did not wish to inform anyone that he was actually using it. In effect,
Corbin said, regardless of what you call it, Cardozo, or what you say you
actually did, my discerning eye perceives what you really did. You cannot fool me, which is a good thing, because I approve of what you did,
even though you did not want to reveal your meaning. So now I have
brought it all out in the open.
Third, perhaps Corbin was pretending the case meant precisely what
he thought it should mean, regardless of what Cardozo actually intended. In other words, Corbin did it deliberately. Why? Because Corbin
had an agenda which he advocated very seriously and very openly: the
liberation of contract doctrine from the iron rule of formalism. At the
17.

Corbin, supra note 10, at 65, 417, 435.
GILMORE, supra note 14, at 128 n.135.

18. G.
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beginning of the opinion, as we shall see, Cardozo wrestled with the difficult and controversial problem of just what was an appropriate definition
of consideration in New York. Cardozo had two routes to choose from:
one basically symbolized by the late nineteenth century New York case
of Hamer v. Sidway, 19 an open and generous elaboration of what might
constitute consideration, and the other, the so-called bargain theory,
which was more tightly controlled, particularly in the hands of Holmes
and Williston.2" Cardozo appeared to pay great deference in Allegheny
College to the latter, referring to it at various times as the "classic doctrine" in all its "ancient rigor." This annoyed Corbin to no end, and this
is what he had to say about it:
The present writer has no criticism of the court's decision in this case;
....

But he knows of no "classic doctrine," except as one is quoted- in the

opinion from the works of Mr. Justice Holmes; and that one is "classic"
only because the man who composed and repeated it is Holmes. The present writer knows of no doctrine of consideration that ever was stated and
applied with "ancient rigor." Instead, the doctrine is one that was totally
unknown in early English law, one that started from nothing and was constructed case by case as reasons for enforcing informal promises were
found. The instant decision marks one more step in that evolutionary process-in the development of a doctrine that is modem rather than "classic"
and that
has always been characterized by flexibility rather than by
"rigor. '21
Corbin was not averse on any occasion to pushing his program. A decade
earlier he had tried to move consideration doctrine along employing a
Cardozo opinion as a springboard.2 2 Perhaps by converting Cardozo's
consideration opinion into an endorsement of promissory estoppel,
Corbin was simply continuing his attack on the elements of the formal or
"classic" system, even if he had to misstate slightly what was going on.
The lesson was clear: nothing was safe from his reorganizing and reforming zeal. And he preferred that the assaults not be as subtle as Cardozo was suggesting-Corbin's style was more straightforward.
19. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891). For a summary of the facts in this case, see infra text
accompanying note 34-35.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 38-43.
21. Corbin, supra note 10, at 66, 418, 436. This paragraph reminds one of a similar argument
made by Grant Gilmore at various points in his THE DEATH OF CONTRACT. G. GILMORE, supra
note 14, at 18-21, 62-65.
22. Corbin, Does A Pre-existing Duty Defeat Consideration?Recent Noteworthy Decisions, 27
YALE L.J. 362 (1918), relying on DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917) (consideration found in agreement by father to pay daughter a certain sum annually in return for daughter's
marriage to fiance, where formal writing recited that the engagement and marriage were consideration of the promise to pay).
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Fourth, for some of the reasons just suggested, Corbin thought the
"supposed," as he put it, doctrine of promissory estoppel was "real."'2 3 In
other words, promissory estoppel, for Corbin, was in reality just part of
consideration, another element of it. And promissory estoppel was a particularly good fit within Corbin's system of thought, because it paid little
or no homage (except as an exception) to the formal requirements of
consideration he rejected. Therefore, recognizing promissory estoppel as
a basis for the holding of the opinion expanded the meaning of consideration more in accord with Corbin's overall purposes, and ought to be her'
alded as an advance-"one more step in that evolutionary process. 24
Fifth, Corbin may have thought there was a sound doctrinal reason
for analyzing the opinion as he did. Corbin's argument might have
stressed the following: within the parameters of the opinion there is no
functional difference between the manipulation of consideration doctrine-finding an implied request by Mary Johnston that the college do
something leading toward an exchange of sorts, or an implied duty of the
college to act in response to her implied request-and promissory estoppel-emphasizing that once Mary made a partial payment, and the college became bound to use the money as she impliedly requested, a
bilateral contract was formed out of the curious combination of "receipt
and implied promise." Was Mary estopped from changing her mind because the college relied on her implied promise and down payment in
agreeing to respond to her by assuming an implied duty?25 The problem,
of course, is that the web of promissory estoppel is at least as tenuous as
the web of consideration. Promissory estoppel would only guide Cardozo's incursion into the realm of conventional wisdom-flexible consideration rather than rigorous consideration.
I am sure that I, as well as others, could propose other possible explanations for Corbin's misreading. Indeed, I may have missed some obvious ones. But I will stop here with only a final thought. If Corbin either
misstated the holding, or at the very least, could not come up with a clear
and convincing explanation of his reading of the case, what conclusion
are we to draw? Has Cardozo failed us? Is the confusion his and not
ours? Or is this just a difficult and troubling area of law that evades quick
and sure-handed treatment? Before we get on with reading the opinion, I
have one more example of grappling with Cardozo in Allegheny College.
23. Corbin, supra note 10, at 65, 417, 435.
24. Id. at 66, 418, 436.
25. See Note, supra note 15, at 273.
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C. [The] Oscillating Cardozo
If Corbin could not correctly figure out Cardozo's legal argumentation, perhaps an excuse does lie in its manner of presentation. Maybe
Corbin had trouble isolating the argument because Cardozo constantly
changed his mind, or at the very least shifted back and forth, from one
doctrinal premise to another. So thought Leon Lipson, in a wonderfully
literate article, which employed the following evocative image:
When we look at the oscillation of argument in the opinion, we are
reminded rather of another image, one that was suggested a hundred years
before the Allegheny College Case by that odd and engaging logician, Richard Whately, sometime later to be Archbishop of Dublin. Judge Cardozo
goes from consideration to promissory estoppel to consideration to duty-&obligation to promise to consideration to promissory estoppel to victory for
Allegheny College. Whenever his argument emphasizing consideration runs
thin, he moves on to promissory estoppel; whenever his hints in favor of
promissory estoppel approach the edge of becoming a committed ground of
decision, he veers off in the direction of the doctrine of consideration. Arguments that oscillate in this way, repeatedly promoting each other by the
alternation, call to mind Whately's simile of "the optical illusion effected by
that ingenious and philosophical toy called the Thaumatrope: in which two
objects are painted on opposite sides of a card-for instance, a man and a
horse, [or]-a bird and a cage"; the card is fitted into a frame with a handle,
and the two objects are, "by a sort of rapid whirl [of the handle], presented
to the mind as combined in one picture-the man on the horse's back, the
bird in the cage."
Now what were the objects painted on the opposite sides of Judge Cardozo's Thaumatrope? His trouble was that on the consideration side he had
a solid rule but shaky facts; on the promissory-estoppel side he had a shaky
rule but (potentially) solid facts. He twirled the Thaumatrope in order to
give the impression that he had solid facts fitting a solid rule. Some lawyers
think that what emerges instead is a picture of a bird on the horse's back.26
Lipson's clever interpolation could carry us a long way to understanding Cardozo's technique in Allegheny College. Except for one problem-I think Lipson was wrong, and he, like Corbin, has also misread
the opinion, though in a far more interesting way than Corbin did. My
reading of the case finds something different-no oscillating or wavering,
though I can understand how one could be easily misled. Rather, I find it
a relatively straightforward lesson in the shadow world of New York
consideration doctrine. The opinion is actually quite logically organized
26. Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977), quoted in C. KNAPP &
N. CRYSTAL, supra note 8, at 152; F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS 509-10
(3d ed. 1986).
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and streamlined. It is also a rather elementary lesson in the historical
evolution of consideration doctrine. In short, Cardozo sought to demonstrate that (a) despite the closed, tight theory of formal consideration
theory, (b) various alterations, expansions, and changes have occurred in
that strict domain, and promissory estoppel is simply a very good historical example of how formal consideration theory has declined and that,
(c) since New York law contains an expansive consideration theory, particularly in charitable subscription cases, (d) we do not need to resort to
promissory estoppel-we can simply rely on its presence as justification
for the general program of expanding consideration doctrine. The opinion suggests that promissory estoppel is a primary historical signpost
demonstrating that the project of making consideration flexible has legitimacy, otherwise promissory estoppel would not have made its way this
far. Therefore, (e) the last half of the opinion is devoted to showing how
the facts of this case fit into the New York version of the expanded
"mould" of consideration-the actual search for consideration-though
even in Cardozo's hands, it is a formidable task. The opinion may appear
to waver, if you do not comprehend the logic and structure. Otherwise, I
think it simply unfolds.
All of this is not to deny that Professor Lipson was on to something.
He was correct in observing that this is a weak factual case on the consideration side, and a weak rule case on the promissory estoppel side. Cardozo knew this before he started writing, and so he sought to reason from
strength, from the established legal rule of consideration. As those who
so mightily labored before him, Cardozo could make almost anything fit
into consideration if he were forced to. He did not waver or blink. If we
understand how he set his stage, we can see through his legerdemain with
New York consideration doctrine. The difficulty is that it appears to be
pure magic because factually it is a difficult case. But in theory, Cardozo
knew exactly what he was doing. Or at least, unless I have misread the
case, I think I understand what he was doing. But you can now read on,
and read with me, and judge for yourself, though I ought to warn you
that, every once in a while, Cardozo gets under my skin, and I may momentarily lapse into cynicism or sarcasm, though I quickly recover and
reclaim the high road. Anyway read on, if you wish, in the tale of a
promise in search of a theory.2 7
27. The Allegheny College decision appears in italics throughout the text. In two instances
where Cardozo's long paragraphs might have led to problems with typography and continuity, the
paragraphs have been broken to maintain the flow in the analysis. The broken paragraphs appear as
independent paragraphs in the text. Excerpts from the opinion addressed directly in the text appear
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II.

OPINION

CARDOZO, Ch. J. The plaintiff Allegheny College, is an institution
of liberal learning at Meadville, Pennsylvania. In June 192L a "drive"
was in progressto securefor-it an additionalendowment of $L250,000. An
appeal to contribute to this fund was made to Mary Yates Johnston of
Jamestown, New York, In response thereto, she signed and delivered on
June 15, 1921, the following writing:
"EstatePledge,
"'Allegheny College Second Century Endowment
"JAMESTOWN, NY. , June 15, 1921.
"'Inconsideration of my interest in Christian Education, and in consideration of others subscribing,I hereby subscribe and will pay to the order,of the Treasurer of Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania, the
sum of Five Thousand Dollars; $5,000.
"This obligation shall become due thirty days after my death, and I
hereby instruct my Executor, or Administrator,to pay the same out of my
estate. This pledge shall bear interest at the rate of ....
per cent per
annum, payable annually,from .... tillpaid. The proceeds of this obligation shall be added to the Endowment of said Institution, or expended in
accordance with instructionson reverse side of this pledge.
"Name
MARY YATES JOHNSTON,
"'Address
306 East 6th Street,
"Jamestown, N.Y
"DA YTON E. McCLAIN Witness
"TR. COURTIS
Witness
"to authentic signature."
On the reverse side of the writing is the following indorsement: "'In
loving memory this gift shallbe known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund, the proceedsfrom which shall be used to educate students preparingfor the Ministry, either in the United States or in the ForeignField.
"This pledge shall be valid only on the condition that the provisions of
my Will, now extant, shall be first met.
"MARY YATES JOHNSTON."
The subscription was not payable by its terms until thirty days after
the death of the promisor. The sum of $1,000 was paid, however, upon
account in December, 1923, while the promisor was alive. The college set
in boldface following the italicized paragraphs. Citations not discussed in this essay have been omitted. Such omissions are not indicated in the text. A complete version of the opinion including all
citations is reproduced in Appendix I, which follows this essay.
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the money aside to be held as a scholarshipfundfor the benefit of students
preparingfor the ministry. Later,in July, 1924, the promisorgave notice to
the college that she repudiated the promise. Upon the expiration of thirty
days following her death, this action was brought against the executor of
her will to recover the unpaid balance.
The two introductory paragraphs presenting the facts are written in
Cardozo's characteristically facile manner. I do not mean this necessarily
as a criticism. He had a gift for summarizing and delivering the most
complex of factual situations in the most elegant and sparse fashion. I
suppose it was part of his craft, though sometimes one senses something
is missing. Like most good lawyers, he tried to load the facts to meet his
view of what he needed to accomplish-a subtle form of judicial advocacy. Every once in a while, a different view of the facts emerges in a
dissent. The best example I can think of is Judge McLaughlin's recasting
in dissent of Cardozo's factual recitation in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
28
Kent.
The facts of Allegheny College seem disarmingly simple. Most of the
summary is taken up by the reproduction of the pledge card. Mary Yates
Johnston signed the pledge card as part of a fund drive at Allegheny
College. She pledged five thousand dollars, due thirty days after her
death. The pledge read that she was subscribing "[iun consideration of
my interest in Christian Education, and in consideration of others subscribing.... ." On the back of the pledge read an indorsement, establishing the purposes of the fund and stipulating that "[iun loving memory
this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund."
(We will see shortly what Cardozo makes of that statement legally.) During her lifetime, Mary Johnston paid one thousand dollars of the pledged
amount. The college placed the money in the fund. Mary then decided
she no longer wished to continue the pledge, and so notified the college.
Cardozo says "she repudiated the promise." When she died, the college
sought to collect "the unpaid balance" from her estate. The facts appear
to be simple and straightforward.
But a number of items ought to attract our attention. First, though
28. In Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921), a contractor sued a
homeowner to recover the unpaid balance on a residence built for the defendant. The homeowner
had withheld payment because the contractor had substituted another brand of pipe for that specified in the contract. Cardozo's opinion admitted that some of the pipe was not the brand specified,
but stressed the pipe was not inferior; therefore, he treated the substitution as insignificant. Id. at
241, 129 N.E. at 889. McLaughlin's dissent, however, stressed that a significant amount of the pipe
installed was not of the type specified, regardless of whether or not it was of the same quality. Id. at
245-47, 129 N.E. at 892.
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it may not be relevant legally in Cardozo's hands, why did Mary Johnston change her mind, and should we care? In the mid-1970s, Richard
Danzig pursued the question, and in his unpublished contracts materials,
in a little essay entitled, "Some Observations on Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua Bank," explained what he found.2 9 A surviving
friend of Mary Yates Johnston provided Danzig With the following
account:
Mary Yates Johnston was an elderly lady who was hard of hearing,
lame and had difficulty in getting about. She was a dear, religious person,
and being very honorable assumed other people were also. She thought, as I
recall her, the Ministers and religious schools were Special.
Some time after the drawing of her will in which she left a legacy to the
College, she decided by the payment of a lower sum to cancel or wipe out
that clause of her will. I don't recall whether her minister or a representative of the college handled the negotiations. I do recall that I stopped at her
home one day. (She had previously talked with me a number of times about
the matter.) She had me close all the doors to the room where she was
sitting and told me that the arrangements were all made to close out that
item or bequest as set forth in her will. She made it very clear to me that she
was giving them a lesser amount than that mentioned in the will in consideration of that legacy being cancelled.
She was so honorable herself and felt others were too, I guess. At any
rate I know that she understood from the college that the legacy to the
college was cancelled upon payment of a lesser sum. I had discussed it frequently with her in her life time. I have had no confidence in the college
since. For as soon as Mrs. Johnston died they called her settlement an advance payment and proceeded to collect the balance of the legacy. I have
never had any regard for the college since that time. Of course she should
have had her attorney draw up the proper receipt and release. 3 °
Why did she cancel the pledge? According to Danzig, "Surviving
contemporaries have suggested that Mary Yates Johnston sought to
withdraw her promise to Allegheny College because she was concerned
about her capacity to both pay the college and to leave enough to her
daughter so that her daughter could in turn aid her impoverished cousins, the Yates." 3 1 Apparently she "revised her will to eliminate"3 all
charitable bequests, not just the one to Allegheny College. What differ29. R. Danzig, An Introduction to the Role of Law in the Realm of Private Agreement 520
(Aug. 1976) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter R. Danzig, Introduction]. This was a short essay
that did not find its way into R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES

(1978).

30. R. Danzig, Introduction, supra note 29, at 523-24.
31. Id. at 526-27. My survey of the record and the briefs on appeal (a generally overlooked
source in doctrinal writing, as if judges either routinely ignore or do not respond significantly to
what is submitted to them) has revealed no factual evidence about what caused Mary Yates Johnston
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ence does that information make if an enforceable promise is an enforceable promise?3 3 Probably little difference, except for one problem in tone
to repudiate her pledge. There is an allusion to family matters in the conclusion of the college's brief
that seems, to coin a phrase, less than charitable.
Whether the attempted revocation was made by the importunities of residuary legatees
who are undoubtedly responsible for the refusal of the executor to voluntarily settle the
claim we cannot say.
How much more proper, however, it is that Allegheny College, which has incurred
responsibilities and performed labors in reliance upon receiving this gift, should now be
paid the sum called for by the subscription than that residuary legatees whose rights
might have been cut off at any time by the whim of defendant's testatrix should receive
something for which they have done nothing to obtain it.
Appellant's Brief at 50. This is consistent with the earnest tone of the brief, which observed elsewhere that the subscriber is
obviously morally obligated. When, however, time rolls on and he (sic] has a change of
heart, then and only then does he begin to hunt around for some way of getting out of
his obligation, just as men are wont to avoid debts for property purchased upon such
grounds as they may be able to conceive to avoid their obligations.
Id. at 24-25
32. Id. at 527.
33. But should the change of mind matter if it reflects a change of circumstances?
If it does amount to a promise, it may be, and when made gratuitously commonly would
be, a promise importing some kind of obligation, but an obligation which both the promisor and the promisee would have great difficulty in defining. If I (without more) state
that I will do a certain thing, I do not conceive that I warrant that I shall do that thing
in any event: making that promise in the utmost good faith, I am understood by honest
men to reserve to myself some discretion; and my nonperformance would in certain
circumstances not be regarded by honest men as a breach of faith even if those circumstances did not amount to an excuse in law. For example, a drastic and unexpected
change of circumstances (even though not amounting to an excuse in law) would in good
faith be held to excuse me. Supposing I write a letter to my son-in-law stating that I
propose to make him an allowance of £1,000 per annum for five years, should I be conceived as bound in good faith to continue the allowance if my daughter and he separated
as a result of mutual dissensions? I believe that good faith would in the circumstances
admit the unexpressed exception-namely, "You and my daughter continue living in
amity", and there would be quite a number of other such admissible exceptions. Yet very
probably if I covenanted to pay such sum without expressing the exception, I should not
according to our present rules of construction be permitted in law to allege such an
exception. Again, good faith would have its grave doubts whether I was bound to the
extent of £1,000 per annum even if the only change in the circumstances was that my
own income happened unexpectedly to fall from £15,000 to £1,500. Good faith would
undoubtedly recognize some obligation in me in those changed circumstances, but not
an absolute one to pay £1,000; and I believe it would regard the payment of £500 as a
very honourable performance under the circumstances. In law, of course, if I had covenanted to pay and was not actually insolvent, the change in my income would be a
matter of entire indifference, unless I had expressed the sum as a fraction of my income.
The point is that a statement respecting my future conduct ... is by common sense
and good faith when made informally and gratuitously very definitely separated from
[another] possible meaning of such a statement. For . . . the statement may mean
(though that is exceedingly improbable when it is made gratuitously and informally,
without express words added) that I not only promise but am willing to bind myself to
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or affect. The opinion is organized to make it appear as if the college is
the injured party, because it is deprived of its important pledge. What if
it turned out that in reality Mary Johnston was the aggrieved party, simply trying to protect her family through an intelligent evaluation and
management of her assets? Or a Mary Johnston just interested in caring
for her family and sharing with them her good fortune? What if the college was raiding the Johnston/Yates family treasury? Should we continue to enforce the promise? Maybe not. Cardozo says not a word about
this. Perhaps he had no reason to know. This case might look different if
it had been presented as the elderly widow who, having made a conscious, rational choice, is pursued ruthlessly by the grasping and invulnerable college, and is driven for protection into the capable, warm, and
open arms of Cardozo.
A final curiosity in these two paragraphs-three times in his recitation of the pledge cards, Cardozo allows to go unremarked a series of
phrases that might explain why the pledge was made: "[i]n consideration
of my interest in Christian Education;" "in consideration of others subscribing;" and "[i]n loving memory." Cardozo usually never missed, or
let go, a fact that was crucial to his argument. But there is not a word
here highlighting the phrases. Are they of no significance legally? Probably not, if Cardozo did not venture to use them. None of them, under the
circumstances in the case, seem to qualify as consideration. At best, they
might be evidence of her motive in pledging. But at this moment in the
opinion, his silence is eloquent testimony to the difficulty of the task he is
embarking on. Maybe it is just a case of prudent and silent question begging. Why should charitable subscriptions be enforced if we have any
doubts that "the general law of contract" might be less than enthusiastic
about providing a safe harbor?
The law of charitable subscriptionshas been a prolific source of controversy in this State and elsewhere. We have held that a promise of that
order is unenforcible like any other if made without consideration. On the
other hand, though professing to apply to such subscriptions the general
law of contract, we havefound considerationpresent where the general law
of contract, at least as then declared, would have said that it was absent
that construction of my actual words of promise which may be put upon them not by
good faith, but by the technical rules of a Court of law. In my opinion, unless express
words or a legal formality are added, the ...meaning is not the meaning attached to a
gratuitous promise either by the most honest promisor, or by the least honest promisee,
or by any reasonable and disinterested bystander.
Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54 L.Q. REv. 233, 244-45 (1938).
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(Barnesv. Perine, 12 N. Y 18; Presb. Soc. v. Beach, 74 N. Y 72; Keuka
College v. Ray, 167 N Y 96; cf Williston, Contracts, § 116).
The law of charitable subscriptions has been a prolific source of
controversy in this State and elsewhere. We have held that a promise of
that order is unenforcible like any other if made without consideration.
At the outset, Cardozo tells us that courts in New York ("and elsewhere") have traditionally tried to fit charitable subscription cases into
standard consideration doctrine to see whether or not these cases pass
muster. A charitable subscription is like any other promise; it is not worthy of any special treatment. Nevertheless, we have been forewarned.
Why else would we be focusing on this problem at all, if it were not for
the fact this category of cases "has been a prolific source of controversy"?
On the other hand, though professing to apply to such subscriptions
the general law of contract, we have found consideration present where
the general law of contract, at least as then declared, would have said
that it was absent. What does that mean? Does that mean that we have
enlarged the theory of consideration, in order to fit this type of promise
within it? Have we been put on notice that the doctrine of consideration,
particularly as applied to charitable subscriptions, has been manipulated
before in New York? He says we found consideration where the general
law of contract, "at least as then declared would have said it was absent."
Is that about to occur again in this case?
A classicform of statement identifies consideration with detriment to
the promisee sustained by virtue of the promise (Hamerv. Sidway, 124 N
Y 538; Anson, Contracts[Corbin's ed.], p. 116; 8 Holdsworth, History of
English Law, 10). So compendious a formula is little more than a half
truth. There is need of many a supplementary gloss before the outline can
be so filled in as to depict the classic doctrine. "The promise and the considerationmust purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at
least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment or
that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting" (Wisc.
& Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386; 1 Williston, Contracts,
§ 139; Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, pp. 82-88). If A
promises B to make him a gift, considerationmay be lacking, though B
has renounced other opportunitiesfor betterment in the faith that the
promise will be kept.
A classic form of statement identifies consideration with detriment
to the promisee sustained by virtue of the promise. The citation for this
proposition is the 1891 New York case of Hamer v. Sidway, also supported by Corbin's Edition of Anson and the English legal historian
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Holdsworth. We all remember the saga of Uncle Willie. In Hamer, an
uncle "promised his nephew that if he would refrain from drinking, using
tobacco, swearing and playing cards or billiards for money until he became twenty-one years of age he would pay him a sum of $5,000. The
nephew assented thereto and fully performed the conditions inducing the
promise." 34 The legal question Was simply whether or not the promise
was supported by consideration, and was therefore enforceable. The New
York Court of Appeals adopted a definition of consideration stressing
legal detriment; in Hamerit was the legal "right he abandoned [drinking,
smoking, swearing, card and billiard playing-sometimes referred to by
modem law students in classroom discussion as generally having fun] for
a period of years upon the strength of the promise... ,"I Hamer seems
to stand for two propositions at least. First, a simple detriment to the
promisee itself will suffice for establishing consideration. Second, almost
any type or degree of detriment will do-a broad or loose definition of
what detriment is will also suffice. After Hamer, New York was a loose
or "expansive" consideration jurisdiction, particularly guided by Cardozo.36 In other words, if you are not careful, you might just "find consideration anywhere." 37 But as of yet, we have only an inkling that there
might be another way to think about the problem. So we start with "a
classic form of statement."
Then comes one of a series of famous Cardozo sentences. So compendious a formula is little more than a half truth. What is little more
than a half truth? That detriment to the promisee sustained by virtue of
the promise is good consideration. There is need of many a supplementary gloss before the outline can be so filled in as to depict the classic
doctrine. What Cardozo now seems to be saying is that New York, having followed Hamer v. Sidway, did not fully adopt the classic doctrine,
that Hamer v. Sidway was only a partial statement of the classic doctrine.
The implication is that the "outline" of the full, complete version of consideration doctrine is only partially "filled in" by Hamer.This is our first
doctrinal clue that things will get complicated.
"The promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive
each for the other, in whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the
promise induces the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise
34. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 540, 27 N.E. 256, 256 (1891).
35. Id. at 546, 27 N.E. at 257. But see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.4, at 44-46 (1982)
(analyzing Hamer in terms of bargain and exchange).
36. G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 62.
37. Id.
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if the other half is wanting." Now look where the quotation comes
from-an opinion by Holmes. And in support, Cardozo uses Williston
and Langdell. He cites Holmes's bargain theory-"reciprocal conventional inducement"-as the fuller, more complete classic formulation of
consideration doctrine, as the true consideration doctrine, the doctrine
by which it appears that we must measure all cases.3" The point seems to
be that if the detriment, as posited in Hamer v. Sidway, is the consequence of the promise, but does not induce the making of the promise,
then there can be no consideration under standard consideration theory.
There has to be reciprocity-the mutual inducement that Holmes talks
about. Now, just to get ahead for a moment, it is clear that in a promissory estoppel example, estoppel would involve for the most part a noninduced, non-bargained promise. That is, the detriment is only a consequence of the promise, and the detriment has not been bargained for. But
notice the disingenuousness, self-consciousness, playfulness, maliciousness or craftsman-like quality (depending on your point of view) with
which Cardozo trots out the old conventional descriptions of what consideration is-setting it up almost as a straw man. I am a believer in .the
old faith, he seems to be saying-far be it from me to challenge it. Since it
is Cardozo speaking, one ought immediately to be suspicious. Cardozo's
citation of Holmes, Williston, and Langdell as gospel is what Professor
Lipson refers to as "the ironic deference that he pays (on the way to
subversion) to the textbook learning on the doctrine of consideration
... ."'I If A promises B to make him a gift, consideration may be lacking, though B has renounced other opportunities for betterment in the
faith that the promise will be kept. This is a simple illustration of how
situations of donative intent do not fit within the bargain principle. The
detriment may be the consequence of the promise (foregoing other, opportunities), but the detriment was not induced and there has been no
bargain. Now we go back to half truths.
The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition
brings it about that qualifications,taken once for granted,are disregarded
or forgotten. The doctrine of consideration has not escaped the common
lot. As far back as 1881, Judge HOLMES in his lectures on the Common
Law (p. 292), separated the detriment which is merely a consequence of
the promisefrom the detriment which is in truth the motive or inducement,
and yet added that the courts "have gone far in obliteratingthis distinc38. Id. at 19-21.
39. Lipson, supra note 26, at 11.

1987]

ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

tion. " The tendency toward effacement has not lessened with the years. On
the contrary, there has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a substitute
for considerationor an exception to its ordinaryrequirementscan be found
in what is styled "a promissory estoppel" (Williston, Contracts, §§ 139,
116). Whether the exception has made its way in this State to such an
extent as to permit us to say that the general law of considerationhas been
modified accordingly, we do not now attempt to say. Cases such as Siegel v.
Spear & Co. (234 N. Y 479) and DeCicco v. Schweizer (221 N. Y 431)
may be signposts on the road. Certain, at least, it is that we have adopted
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in
connection with our law of charitablesubscriptions.So long as those decisions stand, the question is not merely whether the enforcement of a charitable subscription can be squared with the doctrine of considerationin all
its ancient rigor. The question may also be whether it can be squared with
the doctrine of consideration as qualified by the doctrine of promissory
estoppeL
The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition
brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten. Cardozo continues by embracing the classic formulation of Holmes's criticism of the way in which standard, strict
consideration theory has been eroded over time."° It is a little strange
that it should come out of Cardozo's mouth. What he is saying, basically,
is that we now have in New York, through Hamer v. Sidway, a half truth
theory. We have a pure detriment theory without any talk about a
bargain.
The doctrine of consideration has not escaped the common lot. As
far back as 1881, Judge HOLMES in his lectures on the Common Law
(p. 292) separated the detriment, which is merely a consequence of the
promise, i.e., sometimes called detrimental reliance, perhaps as in a
promissory estoppel case, from the detriment which is in truth the motive
or inducement, i.e., a bargain theory, and yet added that the courts "have
gone far in obliterating this distinction." The tendency toward effacement has not lessened with the years. We have moved away, particularly
in New York, from the strict Holmesian conception.4 1 Is it a good thing
or a bad thing that "effacement" has occurred? Is this a deliberate Cardozo strategy-not taking a position of approval or disapproval on "ef0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 227-30 (Howe ed. 1963).
41. This, of course, leaves unanswered the question of where Holmes got his notion from. For
critical views, see G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 20-21 and Corbin, supra note 10, at 66, 418, 436.
40.
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facement," or on the original doctrine effaced, just digging away like an
archaeologist or perhaps an historian, simply making a neutral observation on the fate of things? Cardozo seems to be saying, I am an agnostic
myself on these matters. I am just reporting what I find. Here are the
strands of doctrinal disputation as I see them. To make an informed
judgment, we must know what we have to work with, and what the historical development looked like. Besides, if we are going to change
things, it is helpful to establish a tradition of "effacement." In addition,
Cardozo's seeming insistence on full-blown bargain consideration theory
as the starting point for his analysis seems a bit disingenuous for someone
who "delighted in weaving gossamer spider webs of consideration."4 2
Thus, Cardozo appears to embrace a traditional conception of consideration founded on Holmes's bargain theory. As we will see, Cardozo's application of the strict bargain theory will largely undermine its rigor. On
the contrary, there has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements can
be found in what is styled "a promissory estoppel." (Williston, Contracts, §§ 139, 116.) Not only have we moved toward effacement, not
only has the rigor of the old theory declined, but we now have something
which is a substitute. We have in Holmes's terms obliterated the distinctions. Promissory estoppel is an example of effacement. But look who
Cardozo cites for this proposition. He cites Williston for the notion that
inroads have been made into the standard doctrine, or that at least there
is evidence that the old doctrine is in the process of being altered. This is
irony with a vengeance. At the very least, it is an example of Gilmore's
insight that "[t]he more innovative the decision... the more his opinion
strained to prove that no novelty ... was involved."43 The more you
disturb the landscape, the harder you work to make it appear unscathed.
Whether the exception has made its way in this State to such an
extent as to permit us to say that the general law of consideration has
been modified accordingly, we do not now attempt to say. Far be it from
me, says Cardozo, to hazard a guess. I am just sticking with the old
doctrine. Cases such as Siegel' and DeCicco4 5 may be sign-posts on the
road. What Cardozo does not tell us is that he was the author of one of
those sign-posts. As cogently summarized by Gilmore, Cardozo found in
42. G.
43. G.

GILMORE, supra
GILMORE, supra

note 14, at 62.
note 1, at 75.

44. Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 14 (1923) (where bailee voluntarily undertook
to procure insurance for the bailor's benefit, the promise was part of the entire transaction, obligating
bailee to obtain the insurance as well as take care of the goods).
45. 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).
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DeCicco that "[t]here was consideration for a father's promise to pay his
engaged daughter an annuity after marriage in the fact that the engaged
couple, instead of breaking off the engagement, had in fact married."4 6 In
other words, Cardozo cites himself as authority for the proposition that
sign-posts along the road exist, indicating that an "exception" to the "ordinary requirements" of consideration doctrine has been made. He will
not venture a guess as to whether the Holmesian doctrine has been
"modified accordingly" in New York, though if we read carefully it is
clear Cardozo has had something to do with just a mere suggestion of
change in the air. Just a hint.
Certain, at least, it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our
law of charitable subscriptions. Here it is, a return to the calm shore of
certainty. Promissory estoppel is a substitute for consideration, at least in
charitable subscription cases in New York. Normally that would put us
on notice that the next thing to look for is whether Allegheny College is a
promissory estoppel case because it is a charitable subscription case.
Does Cardozo's statement shift the inquiry? If Cardozo is "certain," why
does he not conclude that he has found the rule he was looking for, that
all that discussion about consideration up until now has been sort of interesting, but now he can finally get down to work? So long as those
decisions stand, the question is not merely whether the enforcement of a
charitable subscription can be squared with the doctrine of consideration
in all its ancient rigor. We do not have to go through those doctrinal
handstands. We do not have to try to figure out whether or not there is
consideration in this case. We can take care of it with promissory estoppel-a legitimate substitute for consideration.
The question may also be whether it can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
That is an interesting theoretical line. Suddenly, the real doctrinal question: if we accept the notion that promissory estoppel qualifies rigorous
consideration theory, do charitable subscription cases fit into the newly
found flexible framework of formal consideration? At this point, we
ought to pause and look back at what Cardozo has accomplished in one
short paragraph-how he has subtly shifted the terrain. There are two
theories at stake: a full-blown rigorous bargain theory, and a half-truth
New York version of it. The half-truth is an example of the effacement of
the rigorous theory. Is Cardozo going to stand for that in New York? Is
46.

G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 62.
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he going to take advantage of the half-truth theory? Or is he going to
restore New York to the pristine purity of rigorous theory? Is he criticizing New York's effacement or is he supporting it? It's hard to say. Perhaps he is merging the categories. On the one hand he says to the
classical bargain theorists, you can have your strict requirements, but I
know the real story is in how you fulfill the requirements. Sure I believe
in consideration, but the game is in what you call it, what satisfies the
concept of consideration. Keep your theory. I'll expand it within conventional definitions. It might even turn out to be an additional effacement.
So now, Cardozo turns to an examination of the New York charitable
subscription cases themselves to discern more accurately how they have
actually been treated.
We have said that the cases in this State have recognized this exception, ifexception it is thought to be. Thus, in Barnes v. Perine (12 N. Y 18)
the subscription was made without request, express or implied, that the
church do anything on the faith of it. Later, the church did incur expense
to the knowledge of the promisor, and in the reasonable belief that the
promise would be kept. We held the promise binding, though consideration
there was none except upon the theory of a promissory estoppel. In Presbyterian Society v. Beach (74 N. Y 72) a situation substantially the same
became the basisfor a like ruling.So in Roberts v. Cobb (103 N. Y 600)
and Keuka College v. Ray (167 N. Y 96) the moulds of considerationas
fixed by the old doctrine were subjected to a like expansion. Very likely,
conceptions of public policy have shaped, more or less subconsciously, the
rulings thus made. Judges have been affected by the thought that
"defences of that character"are "breaches offaith toward the public, and
especially toward those engaged in the same enterprise, and an unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those interested"
(W.F ALLEN J., in Barnes v. Perine,supra,page 24). The result speaks
for itselfirrespective of the motive. Decisions which have stood so long, and
which aresupported by so many considerationsofpublic policy and reason,
will not be overruled to save the symmetry of a concept which itself came
into our law, not so much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as
from historicalaccidents ofpractice andprocedure (8 Holdsworth, History
of English Law, et seq.). The concept survives as one of the distinctivefeatures of our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete
or on the way to be abandoned.As in the case of other concepts, however,
the pressure of exceptions has led to irregularitiesof form.
We have said that the cases in this State have recognized this exception, if exception it is thought to be. Remember, also, that the exception
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is a reference to the middle of the preceding paragraph. The exception,
"what is styled 'a promissory estoppel,'" is an "exception to [the] ordinary requirements" of consideration. It is sometimes also called "a subNotice the grudging reluctance to term
stitute for consideration."
promissory estoppel an exception-"if exception it is thought to be."
Perhaps the argument will demonstrate that promissory estoppel will become another historical example of the expansion of consideration theory, rather than simply an exception to it. (Gilmore suggested that
consideration doctrine, in Cardozo's hands, was "so broadened as to
have become meaningless.") 4 7 And finally, we are to analyze this exception to the consideration doctrine by looking at charitable subscription
cases. We will no longer ask whether enforcement of the cases "can be
squared with the doctrine of consideration in all its ancient rigor," but
whether they "can be squared with ... consideration" as qualified by
promissory estoppel. There is a certain surface confusion here. But let us
plunge on.
Thus, in Barnes v. Perine, he tells us, the subscription was made
without request.., that the church do anything on the faith of it. Later,
the church did incur expense to the knowledge of the promisor, and in
the reasonable belief that the promise would be kept. Hardly a promising
scenario for conventional consideration enforcement. Nevertheless, [w]e
held the promise binding, though consideration there was none except
upon the theory of promissory estoppel.4 8 In Presbyterian Society v.
Beach, it was substantially the same, and so in the last two cases, Roberts
and Keuka College,49 the moulds of consideration as fixed by the doctrine were subjected to a like expansion. Cardozo says we did not use
rigorous consideration doctrine; we used consideration doctrine as expanded by promissory estoppel, and so enlarged the scope of the traditional doctrinal scheme.
47. Id.
48. For a different reading of these cases than Cardozo's assertion that promissory estoppel
applied, see Snyder, PromissoryEstoppel in New York, 15 BROOKLYN L. REV. 27, 34-44 (1948).
49. In Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18 (1854), the defendant was liable for the amount he pledged
toward a fund for the construction of a new church building, where the fund induced church elders
to demolish their old building. Similarly, Presbyterian Soc'y v. Beach, 74 N.Y. 72 (1878) held that
defendant's knowledge that his subscription was to be used for a specified purpose and that plaintiff
was fulfilling that purpose constituted sufficient consideration to enforce payment. Roberts v. Comb,
103 N.Y. 600 (1886) held that a promise to contribute to the discharge of a church's mortgage was
enforceable where the church agreed to raise a specified amount from other subscribers in consideration for the defendant's promise. Lastly, Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N.Y. 96 (1901) held that the
defendant's subscription was enforceable where the plaintiff performed services at the invitation or
request of the subscriber.
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Then, somewhat out of the blue, Cardozo offers a public policy explanation for this "expansion" of consideration doctrine. Very likely,
conceptions of public policy, have shaped more or less subconsciously,
the rulings thus made. What does that mean? Why do we need a public
policy justification at this point in the argument? And, what is the public
policy? He does not tell us precisely what the public policy is. He provides a clue however, in the next sentence: Cardozo, quoting from the
Barnes opinion, observes that judges have been affected by the thought
that "defences of that character" are "breaches of faith towards the public, and especially towards those engaged in the same enterprise, and an
unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those
interested." When donors have decided to withdraw promised gifts, they
have sometimes used consideration doctrine as a legal defense, arguing
that their promises were not enforceable because of lack of consideration.
As a result, the expectations of the charitable institutions may have occasionally been disappointed.
Cardozo implicitly seems to be saying that we want to encourage
donations to schools and colleges, and we want to promote private, philanthropic giving as a matter of public policy. What motivates the holdings in the charitable subscriptions cases is the desire to make it possible
for schools and churches to reap the harvest. We do not want to allow
donors to change their minds and expose such institutions to financial
uncertainties in planning and relying on gifts.50 In other words, Cardozo
suggests, one of the reasons we loosened up the rigorous consideration
doctrine in this instance in New York was because of an important "public policy." The real world has intruded into the thicket of formal doctrine. Progress has reared its head. In any event, Cardozo has identified a
policy factor that may help explain why the New York courts have relaxed the rigorous consideration theory. However, the result speaks for
itself irrespective of the motive. That is, for whatever reason, we must
face the unassailable evidence that at least in this class of cases an exception has been allowed into the otherwise tight fortress of consideration.
Decisions which have stood so long and which are supported by so
many considerations of public policy and reason, that is decisions which
enforce charitable subscriptions, will not be overruled to save the symme50. Occasionally the argument is made that the social policy may be self-defeating since it may
provide a disincentive for people to make charitable contributions: "The frequent argument that the
societal interest in eleemosynary activities explains the distinctive legal treatment of charitable
promises is not convincing. The social benefit from promise-making would be similarly impaired if
enforcement led to restraints on future charitable promises." Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises:An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YA'L9 L.J. 1261, 1307 (1980).
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try of a concept-the concept being consideration doctrine-which itself
came into our law, not so much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and procedure. In another
subtle critique of the standard doctrine, Cardozo tells us that consideration is not all that it is cracked up to be, it might even be an historical
anomaly! Cardozo has demonstrated that all these charitable subscription decisions, based on sound public policy, create a completely defensible "exception" to consideration theory. Therefore, we will not allow
this concept of consideration (whose birth, heritage, and legitimacy he
now challenges, only shortly after having reassured us about the integrity
of the formal doctrine) to prevail simply to preserve the symmetry of the
consideration "concept." Rather, we will expand the doctrine and bend it
a little; in fact, by the end of this opinion we will turn it into a pretzel.
The concept, again the concept of consideration, survives as one of
the distinctive features of our legal system. Now he is about to rehabilitate consideration just after he has damaged it. First he tells us consideration may be an historical accident, then he tells us it is a distinctive
feature of our law. It is possible he is being consistent. We have many
distinctive accidents in our legal system. We have no thought to suggest
that it is obsolete or on the way to be abandoned. The whole purpose of
the previous paragraph was to show the way in which standard consideration has been undermined. Or at least, it showed that consideration is
on the way to being recast, if not formally abandoned. 1 But, Cardozo
says, we do not even want to suggest such an idea-the thought has not
occurred to us. Cardozo, at his most subversive, at the last moment,
calms our fears: As in the case of other concepts, however, the pressure
of exceptions has led to irregularities of form. This is something any
good lawyer would understand. The concept becomes distorted once we
determine that it cannot fit all the problems and all the situations. Exceptions begin to develop, for after all, the common law is expanding and
evolving. Now our new consideration theory will incorporate charitable
subscriptions even though it offends conventional consideration doctrine,
as I suppose it also offends judges who believe in it.52
51. For a while, New York actually flirted with the idea of doing away with the consideration
requirement. In 1937, a statute intending io abolish the doctrine of consideration passed the New
York legislature but was vetoed by Governor Lehman "upon urgent representations from bench,
bar, and business organizations that the great commercial fabric of the Empire State was unprepared
for so radical a change without opportunity for study and discussion." Thompson, Some Current
Economic and Political Impacts in the Law of Contracts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 4, 7 & n.14 (1940).
52. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 379-82,
159 N.E. 173, 177-78 (1927) (Kellogg, J., dissenting); see also G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 75.
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It is in this background of precedent that we are to view the problem
now before us. The background helps to an understandingof the implications inherent in subscription and acceptance. This is so though we may
find in the end that without recourse to the innovation ofpromissory estoppel the transactioncan be fitted within the mould of considerationas established by tradition.
Finally, he tells us what he is going to do. Even though promissory
estoppel has been recognized as an exception to consideration doctrine
for purposes of enforcing charitable subscriptions in New York, he is not
going to use it. Promissory estoppel might be very helpful, but he can get
by with standard consideration doctrine. In effect, he says, I can show
you that if you adopt a theory more or less like the one in Hamer v.
Sidway, I can make the charitable subscription cases fit within the traditional "mould." I don't need promissory estoppel. Watch me. Now at
this point, and up until this point, he has been accused of going from
"consideration to promissory estoppel to consideration.., to promissory
estoppel .... ."' In other words, he oscillates and wavers. I think that is a
misreading. As his emphasis at the beginning of this paragraph suggests,
to this point Cardozo seems primarily concerned with presenting "[t]he
background of precedent," so that we will understand that, at least in his
hands, consideration doctrine is a more open and flexible concept than is
usually appreciated. What he has attempted to demonstrate is the manner in which consideration doctrine has evolved historically. That is all
he is trying to do-provide us with a rather elementary history lesson.
Cardozo, in effect, argues that the established traditional definition of
consideration has been modified over time. The landmarks have shifted,
and the signs of the road have been altered somewhat. Cardozo is not
using promissory estoppel at this point to try to prove that promissory
estoppel ought to be applied in this particular charitable subscription
case. Instead, he is using promissory estoppel to show us that there is
evidence that traditional consideration doctrine is not as tight as it once
was. An historical argument is being developed. Cardozo is trying to
convince us that the'doctrine has responded to some pressure for change,
that it has been infused with notions that perhaps it originally did not
contain, that it has been eroded over time. As an historical matter, promissory estoppel is only evidence of that erosion-a stage in the historical
advance, an example of doctrinal accommodation. And as he prepares
the foundation, Cardozo is also lending legitimacy to the task that he is
53.

Lipson, supra note 26, at 11.
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about to undertake. He is going to show by his manipulation of the consideration doctrine that almost anything can fit into it, making it essentially, by Grant Gilmore's calculation, "meaningless." 5 4 In establishing
the groundwork for the task he is about to embark on, Cardozo reminds
us of the secure pattern of the evolutionary character of legal doctrine. So
now that we know the historical nature of the doctrinal inroads, we can
proceed to an evaluation of what consideration doctrine can actually do
for us today. We have accounted for the wavering doctrine. We will now
set sail in search of consideration.
The promisor wished to have a memorial to perpetuate her name. She
imposed a condition that the 'Jgift" should "be known as the Mary Yates
Johnston Memorial Fund." The moment that the college accepted $LO00
as a payment on account, there was an assumption of a duty to do
whatever acts were customary or reasonably necessary to maintain the memorialfairly andjustly in the spirit of its creation. The college could not
accept the money, and hold itselffree thereafterfrom personalresponsibility to give effect to the condition (1 Williston, Contracts, §§ 90, 370). More
is involved in the receipt of such a fund than a mere acceptance of money
to be held to a corporate use. The purpose of thefounder would be unfairly
thwarted or at least inadequately served if the college failed to communicate to the world, or in any event to applicantsfor the scholarship,the title
of the memorial. By implicationit undertook, when it accepted a portion of
the "'gift," that in its circularsof information and in other customary ways,
when making announcement of this scholarship, it would couple with the
announcement the name of the donor. The donor was not at liberty to gain
the benefit of such an undertakingupon the payment of a part and disappoint the expectation that there would be payment of the residue. If the
college had stated after receiving $1,000 upon account of the subscription
that it would apply the money to the prescribeduse, but that in its circulars
of information and when respondingto prospective applicantsit would deal
with the fund as an anonymous donation, there is little doubt that the
subscriberwould have been at liberty to treat this statement as the repudiation of a duty impliedly assumed, a repudiationjustifying a refusal to
make payments in the future.
The promisor wished to have a memorial to perpetuate her name.
She imposed a condition, that's the first trouble sign, that the "gift"
should "be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund." She
imposed a condition. What follows legally from imposing a condition to
54. G.

GILMORE,

supra note 14, at 62.
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a "gift"? The classification seems ambiguous, perhaps contradictory. Notice Cardozo put "gift" in quotation marks (perhaps quoting the reverse
side of the pledge card), apparently as a signal that he is unwilling to
accept its legal connotation. If it is a "gift," or a "condition" to a "gift,"
we have a long way to go even if we intend to fit the transaction into the
ever expanding "mould" of consideration. Promises to make gifts tend
not to be enforceable promises, even if we wish to cast acceptance of the
"condition" as a promise itself to abide by the condition. The moment
that the college accepted $1,000 as a payment on account, there was an
assumption of a duty to do whatever acts were customary or reasonably
necessary to maintain the memorial fairly and justly in the spirit of its
creation. The one-sentence condition that the fund be named in memory of Mary Yates Johnston has been converted into a possible series of
unnamed duties. When the college accepts the money, it accepts the condition, and the condition seems to have been instantaneously and magically transformed into a duty. Cardozo now moves to foreclose the
possibility that the implied condition in the pledge is a pure expression of
gratuitous intent. In other words, in place of a gratuitous condition for
receiving the gift, Cardozo finds a duty to be performed by the college."5
What is Cardozo up to? He is trying to take this case out of the
realm of gratuitous intent and place it into the mechanics of bargain.
Cardozo is looking either for an implied promise or duty to abide by the
"condition" (a kind of exchange), or some sort of detriment. It appears
that he is trying to figure out a way to find consideration, but how do we
find consideration? Perhaps as in Hamer, either in detriment to the
promisee or benefit to the promisor. Apparently, he is setting up the likelihood that this condition is, once accepted, actually a duty, and therefore can be implied as a promise to carry out the duty, Or perhaps the
duty may in short order amount to a detriment sufficient for us to say a
legal consideration is present. The college could not accept the money,
and hold itself free thereafter from personal responsibility to give effect
to the condition. Again he cites Williston (along with some New York
cases) for the proposition. But the statement is fraught with moral overtones. Once the college takes the money, it accepts some sort of "responsibility." Whether the responsibility is moral or legal or both is not clear.
But the college is bound in some sense. More is involved in the receipt of
such a fund than a mere acceptance of money to be held to a corporate
use. A "mere acceptance" underestimates the responsibility-what ex55. See E.

FARNSWORTH,

supra note 35, § 2.9, at 61-62.
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actly the responsibility is again is not clear, though responsibility implies
that one is bound to do something, even in the absence of a specific
promise.
The purpose of the founder would be unfairly thwarted or at least
inadequately served if the college failed to communicate to the world, or
in any event to applicants for the scholarship, the title of the memorial.
By implication, because, of course, nothing specifically was ever said, it
undertook, when it accepted a portion of the "gift", that in its circulars
of information and in other customary ways, when making announcement of this scholarship, it would couple with the announcement the
name of the donor. What is the duty? Or perhaps the detriment? That the
college has to assume the responsibility for communicating to the world
that Mary Yates Johnston has given money to fund this scholarship,
when and if the college announces its availability? Cardozo conveniently
assumes the money brought with it some implied duties and responsibilities, almost sounding in promise. Of course, "implication" is the linchpin
of the analysis, pushing it toward some identifiable legal doctrine. Why?
Because the parties apparently never actually said anything to each other
on the subject, and so Cardozo is free to say for them whatever will help
establish his point.
Now Cardozo begins to deal with the responsibilities of the donorfor two reasons I think. First, to establish that this transaction might
look like a mutual exchange leading towards promises and consideration,
and second, to suggest that the transaction was of some benefit to the
promisor and, as such, might be an independent source of consideration.
The donor was not at liberty to gain the benefit of such an undertaking
upon the payment of a part and disappoint the expectation that there
would be payment of the residue. Why is that important? Because it is
more evidence of Cardozo's insistent use of the bilateral battering ram. If
the donor cannot withdraw the "residue" of the offer after the college has
started the "undertaking," it must be because they both are obligated to
each other. As a result, the "expectation" would be violated if the promise to pay the money were unfulfilled, particularly since we imply that the
college assumed the duty. Perhaps the point is'that the donor is bound by
the promise to give all the money (particularly if the college carries out
its "duty"), and a failure to do so, assuming consideration is present,
56
would be a violation of the promise, and a breach of contract.
56. Of course, it is possible that Cardozo has something else in mind here-his own unique form
of unilateral contract analysis. If the college is assuming an implied duty of some sort to perform,
and by implication is engaging in part performance, then Cardozo might be arguing that the donor/
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If the college had stated after receiving $1,000 upon account of the
subscription that it would apply the money to the prescribed use, but that
in its circulars of information and when responding to prospective applicants it would deal with the fund as an anonymous donation, there is
little doubt that the subscriber would have been at liberty to treat this
statement as a repudiation of the duty impliedly assumed,-we have now
gone from condition to duty to impliedly assumed duty-a repudiation
justifying a refusal to make payments in the future. That is, the donor of
that money would be free to say "I will make no more payments."
Obligation in such circumstances is correlative and mutual. A case
much in point is N. J. Hospital v. Wright (95 N. J L. 462, 464), where a
subscription for the maintenance of a bed in a hospital was held to be
enforcible by virtue of an implied promise by the hospital that the bed
should be maintainedin the name of the subscriber. A parallelsituation
might arise upon the endowment of a chairor a fellowship in a university
by the aid of annualpayments with the condition that it should commemorate the name of the founder or that of a member of his family. The university would fail to live up to the fair meaning of its promise if it were to
publish in its circulars of information and elsewhere the existence of a
chair or a fellowship in the prescribed subject, and omit the benefactor's
name. A duty to act in ways beneficial to the promisor and beyond the
application of the fund to the mere uses of the trust would be cast upon the
promisee by the acceptance of the money. We do not need to measure the
extent either of benefit to the promisor or of detriment to the promisee
implicit in this duty. "If a person chooses to make an extravagantpromise
for an inadequate consideration it is his own affair" (8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 17). It was long ago said that "when a thing is to be
promisor is now obligated to carry out her portion of the bargain by handing over the full payment.
Once you start performance in some form of reliance on the offer (i.e. by announcing the scholarship
or agreeing to circulate information about it), you are guaranteed that if you complete performance,
thereby accepting the offer, then the other party is required to carry out its obligations. This may be
vaguely akin to what used to be known in the language of Section 45 of the first Restatement as the
"offer for a unilateral contract" situation. If you begin performance looking toward acceptance of an
offer for a unilateral contract, the promisor cannot revoke the offer before the full consideration is
tendered. Acceptance can therefore be accomplished by completed performance. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS

§ 45 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 45 com-

ment a (1979).
For further elaboration of the complexity, if not chaos, inherent in various unilateral contract
scenarios, see Wormser, The True Conception of UnilateralContracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136 (1916).
Wormser later modified his views. See Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 145 (1950). Knapp
and Crystal do an excellent job of tracing the doctrinal evolution of unilateralcontract offers, especially the impact of Section 45 of the Restatement. See C. KNAPP & N. CRYSTAL, supra note 8, at
184-97. See generally Pettit, Moden UnilateralContracts, 63 B.U.L. REV. 551 (1983).
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done by the plaintiff,be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration
to ground an action" (Sturlyn v. Albany, 1587, Cro. Eliz. 67, quoted by
Holdsworth,supra). The longingforposthumous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us in saying that its gratificationis a negligible good.
Obligation in such circumstances is correlative and mutual. What
does that mean? It means we have returned to the secure and relatively
unproblematical world of bilateral contracts. It looks like Cardozo is saying, I have found it, I have found mutuality. I have found correlative
duty. 7 I may still be having trouble finding consideration, but something
impliedly mutual is occurring. Both parties must be bound or neither is
bound,5 8 and Cardozo is asserting that in this case, in this situation, both
parties are bound. One party is bound to conform to the promise to give
the amount, the other party is bound under its assumption of implied
duty to conform to the terms running with the condition. If one party
breaches, the other party could sue, and it does not matter which party
breaches. He seems to be arguing that if mutuality is present, then consideration must also be present, because mutuality is evidence of the ex59
change of promises. A case much in point, N.J. Hospital v. Wright,
illustrates his mutuality point, as well as does his reference to the "parallel situation" of the endowed chair or fellowship in the university. The
"condition" is that the benefactor's name be commemorated, or "the fair
meaning of its "promise" would be violated, if the name were not mentioned when information was circulated. The promises, actual or implied,
set up a mutuality, almost an intended exchange. But we are about to
accelerate at a dizzying speed.
A duty to act in ways beneficial to the promisor and beyond the
57. Mutuality was an issue in the New York courts of the time. See Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v.
Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921) ("requirement" contract consisting
solely of letter written by sales manager of the defendant company to the plaintiff company lacked
mutuality where obligation assumed by defendant was to pay a certain price per pound for glue if
any should be ordered).
58. See, e.g., id.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(c) (1979) reflects a different approach today:
"If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of... (e)'mutuality
of obligation.'" Comment f states that "[t]he word 'mutuality' though often used in connection with
the law of Contracts, has no definite meaning," and the statement "[b]oth parties must be bound or
neither is bound," "is obviously erroneous as applied to an exchange of promise for performance," as
well as the class of contracts without consideration.
59. 95 N.J.L. 462, 113 A. 144 (1921) (where defendant stipulated that her charitable contribution be applied to building an operating room, and the plaintiff hospital sought and obtained a waiver
of a similar privilege held by another contributor, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
consideration for defendant's promise to contribute to plaintiff's building fund).
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application of the fund to the mere uses of the trust would be cast upon
the promisee by the acceptance of the money. Cardozo has done two
things there. He has transformed the duty to act, which might be a detriment to the promisee, into a benefit to the promisor, and normally, under
cases like Hamer, we need only one of those elements, detriment to the
promisee or benefit to the promisor. But he has also turned the inquiry
around. It looked at first like Cardozo would be satisfied with merely
implying a duty, because that might mean detriment, but apparently he is
not willing to settle for just duty or implied duty.
We do not need to measure, he says, the extent either of benefit to
the promisor or of detriment to the promisee implicit in this duty. That
is, we do not want to inquire as to how much benefit or detriment there
is. I am having enough trouble, he seems to be saying, trying to make the
argument that there is any at all. In Hamer v. Sidway, if Cardozo had
wished to recall, the court had said that it did not have to get involved in
whether or not there was any benefit to the promisor, Uncle Willie. All
the Hamer court was concerned about was whether or not Willie's
nephew suffered a detriment. But the Hamer court also said that perhaps
it could find some sort of benefit to the promisor in that case: "[W]ere it a
proper subject of inquiry, we see nothing in this record that would permit
a determination that the uncle was not benefited in a legal sense." 6 Precisely what would the benefit to the promisor have been? Probably not an
economic benefit; but perhaps it was psychological (Uncle Willie's motivation for the promise to reward his nephew for refraining from bad habits). Uncle Willie felt good at accomplishing the goal-pointing the way
toward an upstanding life. Whatever the benefit was, there may not have
been much that was measurable or identifiable in the benefit, but even an
ephemeral benefit appeared to satisfy the requirements of consideration
in New York.
Let us see what Cardozo has to say about the extent of the benefit to
the promisor or the detriment to the promisee. First he justifies his refusal to measure the amount of benefit or detriment by his assertion that
"[i]f a person chooses to make an extravagant promise for an inadequate
consideration it is his own affair." This is standard hornbook learning:
we do not generally inquire into the adequacy of consideration. Once we
establish that there is an implied duty or a benefit, we are not required to
measure either, nor to make sure that they are adequate in the balanceany amount will do.
60.

Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. at 546, 27 N.E. at 257.
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Cardozo then cites a case from 1587, a chestnut having survived
almost three hundred and fifty years: It was long ago said that "when a
thing is to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient
consideration to ground an action." What is the principle here? The principle, and the irony, is that the standard doctrine that we will not inquire
into adequacy of consideration is one of the cornerstones of the noninterventionist tendency in consideration doctrine. We will not investigate or
supervise individual bargains in most circumstances. Cardozo is using
the principle of nonintervention now in a totally disingenuous (dare I use
that word again?) way. He is applying formal doctrine to relax. the concept of consideration. In effect, he is saying that even when we alter the
contours of consideration doctrine by implying duties and promises, we
still follow the old rules that do not permit an inquiry into the adequacy
of consideration. Thus, almost anything will stand for considerationeven the most limited and attenuated duties and promises, shielded from
scrutiny, will become enforceable. It was an instrumental use of formal
doctrine-maybe Cardozo was capable of cynicism.
Then we come to a quintessential Cardozo sentence. (It is hard to
read this one without weakening; in the constellation of Cardozo
sentences this is right up there with the "willful transgressor" who "may
hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong.") 6 1 The longing
for posthumous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us
in saying that its gratification is a negligible good. What does Cardozo
mean? He means that in searching for the benefit to the promisor he is
perfectly willing to consider totally subjective elements like whether Uncle Willie, in Hamer, felt better from seeing his nephew not drink. Cardozo is now willing to consider whether there are noneconomic elements,
subjective elements, sufficient to constitute a benefit to the promisor-for
instance, whether Mary Yates Johnston felt good knowing that there
would be a fund in her name at Allegheny College.6 2 In other words, says
Cardozo, if we are really serious about defining consideration, I will
show you consideration where you never saw it before, where you never
imagined it could exist. That is the whole purpose of the exercise. I will
fill it out just the way you want it, and I will.cite Williston and Langdell,
and Holmes as justification. I will even wrap this subjective benefit the61. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. at 244, 129 N.E. at 891.
62. See J. DAWSON, GiFs AND PROMISES 206 (1980) ("[I]f the performance promised will
promote some commendable cause, this may inspire an intensive search for some hidden, self-serving
motive that will make a gift look like an exchange."). Dawson states it is "compulso6" to cite
Allegheny College in support of this proposition. Id. at n.22
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ory under the protective cloak of objective "adequacy" theory, thus insuring that it is protected from scrutiny by the anti-monitoring
mechanisms approved by Holmes. Now what have we got? What does
this entire paragraph mean? Does it mean that we have consideration?
That we have a detriment to the promisee and/or a benefit to the promisor? We have condition turned into duty, we have benefits to promisors,
we have mutuality. Is he suggesting here that there is a bargain? Is that
what this is all about? Who knows? Let us read on.
We think the duty assumed by the plaintiff to perpetuate the name of
the founder of the memorial is sufficient in itself to give validity to the
subscription within the rules that define considerationfor a promise of that
order. When the promisee subjected itself to such a duty at the implied
requestof the promisor,the result was the creation of a bilateralagreement
(Williston, Contracts, §§ 60-a, 68, 90, 370). There was a promise on the
one side and on the other a returnpromise, made, it is true, by implication,
but expressing an obligation that had been exacted as a condition of the
payment. A bilateral agreement may exist though one of the mutual
promises be a promise "implied in fact," an inference from conduct as
opposed to an inferencefrom words (Williston, Contracts,§§ 90, 22-a). We
think the fair inference to be drawnfrom the acceptance of a payment on
account of the subscription is a promise by the college to do what may be
necessary on its part to make the scholarship effective. The plan conceived
by the subscriber will be mutilated and distorted unless the sum to be accepted is adequate to the end in view. Moreover, the time to affix her name
to the memorial will not arrive until the entire fund has been collected.
The college may thus thwart the purpose of the payment on account if at
liberty to reject a tender of the residue. It is no answer to say that a duty
would then arise to make restitutionof the money. If such a duty may be
imposed, the only reasonfor its existence must be that there is then a failure of "consideration." To say that there is a failure of considerationis to
concede that a considerationhas been promised since otherwise it could not
fail.No doubt there are times and situationsin which limitations laid upon
a promisee in connection with the use of what is paid by a subscriberlack
the quality of a consideration, and are to be classed merely as conditions
(Williston, Contracts, § 112).
We think the duty assumed by the plaintiff to perpetuate the name
of the founder of the memorial is sufficient in itself to give validity to the
subscription within the rules that define consideration for a promise of
that order. Now we return to duty, the implied duty to abide by the
implied additional terms that flow from the condition; the assumption of
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that responsibility is sufficient as a legal duty to provide consideration.
Now why does Cardozo return to the duty of the college? Because he has
a problem here, as earlier, in the dissent. The dissent is proclaiming that,
at the very most, there is a unilateral contract.6 3 What does Cardozo
have to show in order to rebut that argument? He has to show that there
is a bilateral agreement-promises supported by consideration. How
does he show that?
When the promisee subjected itself to such a duty at the implied
request of the promisor, the result was the creation of a bilateral agreement. Then Cardozo cites Williston again. There was a promise on the
one side and on the other a return promise, made, it is true, by implication, then Cardozo picks up momentum, but expressing an obligation
that had been exacted as a condition of the payment. Now, let us read on,
for a second.
A bilateral agreement may exist though one of the mutual promises
be a promise "implied in fact," an inference from conduct as opposed to
an inference from words. Williston once again." We think the fair inference to be drawn from the acceptance of a payment on account of the
subscription is a promise by the college to do what may be necessary on
its part to make the scholarship effective. The plan conceived by the subscriber will be mutilated and distorted unless the sum to be accepted is
adequate to the end in view. All right, pretty strong words, "mutilated
and distorted" for such a simple duty. Moreover, the time to affix her
name to the memorial will not arrive until the entire fund has been collected. The college may thus thwart the purpose of the payment on account if at liberty to reject a tender of the residue. He has turned the
world upside down, has he not? Now all the burden is on the college. It is
no answer to say that a duty would then arise to make restitution of the
money. In other words, what would happen if the college breached? If
63. In his dissent, Kellogg is very careful to point out that even if an offer to enter into a
unilateral contract was present, the college never accepted the offer and, therefore, there was no
contract. 246 N.Y. at 380, 159 N.E. at 177.
64. The ideas and language here may also have been drawn in part from the Keuka College
case:
[The question of enforceability in charitable subscription cases may be reduced to]
whether the agreement which is sought to be enforced, and which is a voluntary promise
on the part of the defendant, expressly or impliedly, either imposes upon the promisee
some obligation, which is assumed, or requests of the promisee the performance of services, which are to be performed upon the strength of the promise .. . .Nor need a
request to the promisee to perform the services be expressed in the instrument; it may be
implied.
Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N.Y. 96, 99-100 (1901).
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the college has an implied duty, and if it can violate it, then there must be
a detriment to the promisee. The reason there must be detriment is because there must be consideration, because if there is consideration, you
can sue the other party. If you can sue the other party, then there must
be a contract. That is why we are being led down the path.
In effect, Cardozo is trying to buttress his bilateral contract argument by demonstrating that both parties have obligations to each other
which may be frustrated in their own way by each. A duty "to make
restitution" is no answer, because there must be some reason for that
"duty." The "duty" must be grounded in the relationship between the
parties. A gift, condition to a gift, or a unilateral contract does not impose a "duty." What does? Cardozo's bilateral contract is found in the
exchange of promises, even if implied, between the parties.
If such a duty may be imposed, he says, the only reason for its existence must be that there is then a failure of "consideration." To say that
there is a failure of consideration is to concede that a consideration has
been promised since otherwise it could not fail. No doubt there are times
and situations in which limitations laid upon a promisee in connection
with the use of what is paid by a subscriber lack the quality of a consideration, and are to be classed merely as conditions. Now, at this late
hour, we return to Williston for justification and for insight into the particularly difficult problem of distinguishing between a mere condition to
a gift and consideration. Having established the parameters of a bargained for exchange supported by consideration, Cardozo now fends off
the original problem with which he began-is this consideration or a
condition to a gift? Cardozo invokes Williston's tramp case to get him
out of the bind.
"It is often difficult to determine whether words of condition in a
promise indicate a requestfor considerationor state a mere condition in a
gratuitouspromise. An aid, though not a conclusive test in determining
which construction of the promise is more reasonableis an inquiry whether
the happeningof the condition will be a benefit to the promisor.If so, it is a
fair inference that the happening was requested as a consideration" (Williston, supra, § 112). Such must be the meaning of this transactionunless
we arepreparedto hold that the college may keep the payment on account,
and thereafter nullify the scholarship which is to preserve the memory of
the subscriber.The fair implication to be gatheredfrom the whole transaction is assent to the condition and the assumption of a duty to go forward
with performance. The subscriber does not say: I hand you $1,000, and
you may make up your mind later, after my death, whether you will un-
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dertake to commemorate my name. What she says in effect is this: I hand
you $1,000, and ifyou are unwilling to commemorate me, the time to
speak is now.
"It is often difficult to determine whether words of condition in a
promise indicate a request for consideration or state a mere condition in
a gratuitous promise. An aid, though not a conclusive test in determining
which construction of the promise is more reasonable is an inquiry
whether the happening of the condition will be a benefit to the promisor.
If so, it is a fair inference that the happening was requested as a consideration." 65 The condition is consideration if it was a benefit to the promisor. Do not forget that in the preceding paragraph Cardozo has
attempted to demonstrate how the promise to fund a memorial scholarship could be of benefit to Mary Johnston. She received subjective benefit
out of it. She felt good. It was important to her. Thus, even if we do not
believe that there is an implied duty on the part of the college, it could be
that the condition is converted into consideration because it is of some
benefit to the promisor.
Such must be the meaning of this transaction unless we are prepared
to hold that the college may keep the payment on account, and thereafter
nullify the scholarship which is to preserve the memory of the subscriber. That would be unfair, or at least not nice behavior, and onesided. Certainly the interaction is susceptible to analysis more consistent
with understandings in the real world. The fair implication to be gathered from the whole transaction is assent to the condition and the as65.

Williston's example is as follows:
If a benevolent man says to a tramp,--"if you go around the comer to the clothing shop
there, you may purchase an overcoat on my credit," no reasonable person would understand that the short walk was requested as the consideration for the promise, but that in
the event of the tramp going to the shop the promisor would make him a gift. Yet the
walk to the shop is in its nature capable of being consideration. It is a legal detriment to
the tramp to take the walk, and the only reason why the walk is not consideration is
because on a reasonable interpretation, it must be held that the walk was not requested
as the price of the promise, but was merely a condition of a gratuitous promise.
It is often difficult to decide whether words of condition in a promise indicate a request for consideration or state a mere condition in a gratuitous promise. An aid, though
not a conclusive test in determining which interpretation of the promise is more reasonable, is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will be a benefit to the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that the happening was requested as a consideration. On
the other hand, if, as in the case of the tramp stated above, the happening of the condition will be not only of no benefit to the promisor but is obviously merely for the purpose
of enabling the promisee to receive a gift, the happening of the event on which the promise is conditional, though brought about by the promisee in reliance on the promise, will
not be interpreted as consideration.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 112 (3d ed. 1957).
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sumption of a duty to go forward with performance. Finally, desperate
Cardozo cites, among others, Corbin. The subscriber does not say: (and
here is the real offer and acceptance problem) I hand you $1,000, and you
may make up your mind later, after my death, whether you will undertake to commemorate my name. What she says in effect is this: I hand
you $1,000, and if you are unwilling to commemorate me, the time to
speak is now. In other words, Cardozo is saying that the acceptance must
have been made at the moment the offer, if it was an offer, was tendered.
The acceptance consisted of an implied promise manifested by the act of
taking the money, which was a portion of the total promised amount.
The acceptance was made with an implied promise that is just like an
implied duty.6 6 Therefore, offer and acceptance transpired during the
subscriber's lifetime, and we are not faced with the problem of an unaccepted offer lapsing with the death of the subscriber. The implied promise is the promise to conform to the terms of the condition, or to accept
the terms of the implied duty. That is the best Cardozo could do because,
needless to say, the parties never engaged in any actual give and take.
They never engaged in a formal bargain, an exchange of offer and acceptance, such as theoretically transpires in a commercial bargaining or exchange situation. As Cardozo said in another context, though, there is
"an air of unreality"'6 7 about his reconstruction of the legal consequences
of the minimal interaction between the parties.6 8
The conclusion thus reached makes it needless to consider whether,
aside from the feature of a memorial, a promissory estoppel may result
from the assumption of a duty to apply the fund, so far as alreadypaid, to
specialpurposes not mandatory under the provisions of the college charter
(the support and education of students preparingfor the ministry), an assumption induced by the beliefthat otherpayments sufficient in amount to
make the scholarshipeffective would be added to the fund thereafter'upon
the death of the subscriber(Barnesv. Perine, 12 N. Y 18, and cases there
cited).
This is not a promissory estoppel case or problem, Cardozo says.
66. Cardozo was no stranger to implying promises. In fact, he seemed to like doing it. For
example, "it is true that he does not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to
place the defendant's indorsements and market her designs. We think, however, that such a promise
is fairly to be implied." Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon, 222 N.Y. at 90-91, 118 N.E. at 214.
67. Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 245 N.Y. 284, 291, 157 N.E. 140, 142 (1927).
68. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 n.8 (1979) ("while enforcement in
[cases involving donative promises to charitable institutions] is usually rationalized on either a bargain or reliance theory, often these theories are made to apply only by straining or distorting the
transaction at hand.")
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Why? Because the duty of the promisee became at least part of the consideration, particularly if the college assumed a duty over and above its
mandatory duties under its charter. We do not need to get involved in the
types of questions that typically are asked in a promissory estoppel situation. All we have to do is pursue consideration. Why not raise the types
of questions that we normally ask in promissory estoppel situationssuch as, in the language of the old Restatement-was there a promise
reasonably inducing definite and substantial action?69 Because we do not
have any answers, and if we look closely at the conduct of the parties, we
have promissory estoppel problems. It would be hard to find detrimental
reliance on the part of the college. Detrimental reliance does not necessarily follow in this case from the assumption of a duty because it is
difficult to isolate exactly what the college did in reliance on Mary Yates
Johnston's promise, except perhaps to open a bank account to deposit
her money-hardly a substantial change in position. Consideration
might not follow either because we have had to struggle to find the elements of what looks like a bargained for exchange, by implying circumstances all over the place. Even if we were looking just for detriment or
benefit, we would have had to reach. The fit in either instance is not
comfortable. But at least there is more play in the consideration formula
than in the relatively undeveloped terrain of promissory estoppel, even
applied to charitable subscription cases, circa 1927. What emerges, believe it or not, is an exchange, a bargain-validated by the expanded
"moulds" of standard consideration doctrine.
The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term
should be reversed, andjudgment orderedfor the plaintiffas prayedfor in
the complaint, with costs in all courts.
III.

CONCLUSION

Exactly what was the problem that Cardozo faced in this case? Litigation is easiest when strong facts mesh with firm law, but a good lawyer
can make do with either strong facts or firm law. At first blush, Cardozo
had neither. It would have been very easy to turn the facts into a tawdry
headline-"Grasping College Decimates Old Woman's Estate"-especially if Danzig's facts7 ° had been in any way inferable from the record.
And if anything was clear about classical contract law, it was that dona69. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
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tive promises were unenforceable. Some lawyers would have thrown in
the towel at that point.
The questions posed on appeal by both parties focused on whether
the pledge was supported by consideration and was therefore enforceable. There is no mention of Hamerv. Sidway, or Holmes for that matter,
in either brief. Promissory estoppel is not mentioned at all in the college's
brief; it is barely mentioned in the respondent's brief or the college's reply brief. Rather, the college's brief often stressed notions of reliance, or
its "responsibility" to do certain vaguely defined things (like administering a fund).7 1 This may have been so for a couple of reasons. The trial
judge concluded that the college had acted in reliance only by "setting
aside the $1,000.00 towards the memorial fund."72 The judge also found
that, although the Johnston subscription was used to induce other subscriptions to the endowment fund, such use was not "done with knowledge of Mary Yates Johnston."7 3 Thus, the trial judge cut the heart out
of the factual basis of the substantial reliance arguments. Faced with
these factual findings, the college chose to divide its consideration argument into two parts: first, that "the procurement of other subscriptions
constituted a valid consideration. . . ,"4and second, that "the establishment of the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund was a consideration
....
2,7 The "procurement of other subscriptions" argument was fraught
with danger, not the least of which was that there seemed to be no evidence that the Johnston pledge was conditioned on other subscriptions to
her specific fund, or for that matter, the college's general endowment
fund. The college seemed to suggest that the Johnston pledge reduced the
amount of money it would have to raise elsewhere, and that in reliance
on her pledge, it had engaged in the forbearance of the opportunity to
seek funds that she had already contributed to the general fund drive.7 6
How did Cardozo react to these arguments? In the briefs, the attorneys did not analyze the legal and factual issues as Cardozo eventually
did. Although Cardozo used some of the legal sources found in the briefs,
the legal argument in the opinion seems uniquely his. He ignored the
college's argument for consideration based on procurement of other subscriptions, apparently finding it insufficient, and he went much further
than the college did in elaborating its argument resting on the "establish71. Appellant's Brief at 33.
72. Record at 44.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Appellant's Brief at 19.
75. Id. at 29.
76. Id. at 32-36.
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ment of the Johnston fund as consideration." The executor's brief had
quoted extensively from Williston's incisive discussion of consideration
and promissory estoppel in charitable subscription cases,77 and concluded that "no element of estoppel here exists, no damage has been sustained or expense incurred or liability assumed on the strength of the
promise in question."' 78 And again, Hamer v. Sidway, Holmes, and bargain theory as theory are not discussed by either party. But there may be
a clue as to what motivated Cardozo to write as he did.
One of the lawyers for the bank, as executor of Mary Yates Johnston's estate, was Robert H. Jackson, who within a decade or so was
named Solicitor General of the United States, and then Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court. Jackson represented the bank at
trial and in oral argument before the Court of Appeals. The brief, though
signed by all the attorneys for the respondent, is written in Jackson's
characteristic lively and assertive fashion. It is also witty, self-assured if
not smug, and acerbic. Jackson's tone conveyed agitated impatience with
the college, casting college fund drives as oppressive, grasping, and intrusive devices; he referred somewhat contemptuously to "thrive by drive"7 9
and "drivees." 8 ° In part, Jackson may have been attempting to counter
the college's tone as it sought to characterize the repudiation of the
pledge as some kind of moral failing.
In the end, Jackson may have been unduly provocative-suggesting
for instance, that "[s]uch inventions as 'implied requests' and assumed
compliance therewith, making a meritorious object itself supply the consideration, and other judicial dodges promises to keep the subject in confusion."'" Later, he ventured that "[t]he Court has not in the past, and
probably will not now, invent fictitious considerations that invite the contempt of those who hope to see the law an honest, if not an exact science." 82 In Appendix II, I have excerpted some of Jackson's pithy
statements, subdivided more or less by subject matter or theme. They
deserve to see the light of day after all these years, but they also may help
explain some of Cardozo's opinion. There is a certain tension between
Jackson's pronouncements and Cardozo's resolution of the doctrinal
problems in the opinion. Jackson seems to be saying I dare you to justify
the result in this case by engaging in the metaphysical mental gymnastics
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Respondent's Brief at 19-22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 24.
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of consideration doctrine. It will be hypocritical and confusing to boot.
There is no consideration here. Jackson may have overreached. Cardozo
may simply have responded by saying, I Will show you what I can do.
And though he may have risen to the bait, Cardozo did so in his own
reserved and hushed tones. I am not convinced this was the dynamic
between them, but if you compare the excerpts from Jackson's brief and
Cardozo's opinion, you might conclude something is percolating between
them. Maybe it was not a good idea to suggest to Cardozo that "judicial
dodges" or "fictitious considerations" were in the air. Maybe it was not a
good idea to risk making Cardozo angry, if he could become angry. On
the other hand, perhaps Cardozo thought Jackson's rhetoric was all
within the accepted limits of lawyering.
At the same time, one should notice that as a judge with a missionloosening up, maybe even disjointing, the classical law of contracts, torts,
etc.-Cardozo faced difficult conceptual problems and made substantial
advances. 83 Hamer was hardly a secure precedent around which a great
edifice had been erected. Indeed, it was more of a lighthouse than a castle. And promissory estoppel was hardly developed beyond the most classic of charitable subscription cases. With facts as weak as in Allegheny
College, it would have been difficult for most judges to move the doctrine
along in the direction that Cardozo wished. Normally, strong facts drag
the doctrine with them. Yet, here again Cardozo's craft shows how much
can be done with just a few raw materials, for he manages to push forward simultaneously on both doctrinal fronts. Simply by using Hamer,
drawing a few inferences about the nature of reasonable conduct, and
turning a piece of Holmes's objective theory on its head to create liability
rather than limit it, Cardozo was able both to reinforce Hamer as a precedent and suggest a new and at the same time familiar way of thinking
about what might be consideration. In so doing, Cardozo demonstrated
that a formal exchange requirement might be "implied" or met in the
most attenuated way.
By positioning, if only in dictum, promissQry estoppel not as an ex83. It is, of course, fair to ask-what was Cardozo's larger purpose in this and similar enterprises? As one of my colleagues, David Engel, observed of Cardozo's tort opinions, "What is all of
this fancy dancing about?" Is Cardozo maintaining a pose of calculated uncertainty as a matter of
personal or psychological style, instrumental strategy, or cosmic insight? Is he on a mission to alter
the law of contracts in some particular direction? He is elusive. Why is an important question; an
investigation of what he is trying to accomplish is significant. I leave that point to others, or other
occasions. My aspiration in this essay was simply to unpack how he analyzed the legal problem, a
subject of.some dispute, and not to address why he did it the way he did in some fundamental
epistemological sense.
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ception to consideration doctrine, but squarely within it, Cardozo opened
the possibility (though never realized by him or his court) that in the
next case promissory estoppel could be found in a commercial circumstance. Bargain theory was used to make all doctrinal moves appear as
mainstream as possible. To make such gains, in a two-front war with
such poor troops on such unpromising terrain, bordered on the inspired.
What are we left with at the end of this opinion? The free-standing
structure of the analysis looks something like this: After the statement of
"facts," there is an opening foray of several paragraphs into the problem
area of consideration doctrine in charitable subscription cases in New
York, focusing on a definition of consideration. The conclusion is that
whatever consideration is, it is, at the least, an expansive, flexible, and
adaptable doctrine. Then, as evidence of that insight, the concept of
promissory estoppel is introduced, not as an exception to consideration
doctrine, but as a continuation of the process of enlarging it. In other
words, promissory estoppel is used informatively, as an historical lesson,
and instrumentally, as a means to expand consideration. The "background of precedent" allows Cardozo to fit charitable subscription cases
into "the mould of consideration as established by tradition," but more
particularly, by his understanding and reshaping of that tradition. The
remainder of the opinion consists of a search for the factual components
of consideration, not an easy search.
The result brings to mind again Professor Lipson's Thaumatrope,
but this time after one more spin, it reveals Cardozo trapped by the facts
of the case and the unsettled law, an image of a man in a cage.
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APPENDIX I
ALLEGHENY COLLEGE, Appellant, v. THE NATIONAL CHAUTAUQUA
COUNTY BANK OF JAMESTOWN, as Executor of
MARY Y. JOHNSTON,

Deceased, Respondent.
246 N.Y. 369; 159 N.E. 173; 57 A.L.R. 980 (1927)
CARDOZO, Ch. J. The plaintiff, Allegheny College, is an institution
of liberal learning at Meadville, Pennsylvania. In June 1921, a "drive"
was in progress to secure for it an additional endowment of $1,250,000.
An appeal to contribute to this fund was made to Mary Yates Johnston
of Jamestown, New York. In response thereto, she signed and delivered
on June 15, 1921, the following writing:
"Estate Pledge,
"Allegheny College Second Century Endowment
"JAMESTOWN, N. Y., June 15, 1921.
"In consideration of my interest in Christian Education, and in consideration of others subscribing, I hereby subscribe and will pay to the
order of the Treasurer of Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania,
the sum of Five Thousand Dollars; $5,000.
"This obligation shall become due thirty days after my death, and I
hereby instruct my Executor, or Administrator, to pay the same out of
my estate. This pledge shall bear interest at the rate of .... per cent per
annum, payable annually, from .... till paid. The proceeds of this obligation shall be added to the Endowment of said Institution, or expended in
accordance with instructions on reverse side of this pledge.
"Name
MARY YATES JOHNSTON,
"Address
306 East 6th Street,
"Jamestown, N.Y.
"DAYTON E. McCLAIN Witness
"T.R. COURTIS
Witness
"to authentic signature."
On the reverse side of the writing is the following indorsement: "In
loving memory this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund, the proceeds from which shall be used to educate students
preparing for the Ministry, either in the United States or in the Foreign
Field.
"This pledge shall be valid only on the condition that the provisions
of my Will, now extant, shall be first met.
"MARY YATES JOHNSTON."
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The subscription was not payable by its terms until thirty days after
the death of the promisor. The sum of $1,000 was paid, however, upon
account in December, 1923, while the promisor was alive. The college set
the money aside to be held as a scholarship fund for the benefit of students preparing for the ministry. Later, in July, 1924, the promisor gave
notice to the college that she repudiated the promise. Upon the expiration of thirty days following her death, this action was brought against
the executor of her will to recover the unpaid balance.
The law of charitable subscriptions has been a prolific source of controversy in this State and elsewhere. We have held that a promise of that
order is unenforcible like any other if made without consideration (Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581; Presb. Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y.
517; 23rd St. Bap. Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601). On the other hand,
though professing to apply to such subscriptions the general law of contract, we have found consideration present where the general law of contract, at least as then declared, would have said that it was absent (Barnes
v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18; Presb. Soc. v. Beach, 74 N. Y. 72; Keuka College
v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96; cf. Eastern States League v. Vail, 97 Vt. 495, 508,
and cases cited; Y M. C. A. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291; Amherest Academy v.
Cowls, 6 Pick. 427; Ladies CollegiateInst. v. French, 16 Gray, 196; Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114; Robinson v. Nutt, 185 Mass. 345; U of Pa. v.
Coxe, 277 Penn. St. 512; Williston, Contracts, § 116).
A classic form of statement identifies consideration with detriment
to the promisee sustained by virtue of the promise (Hamerv. Sidway, 124
N. Y. 538; Anson, Contracts [Corbin's ed.], p. 116; 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10). So compendious a formula is little more than a
half truth. There is need of many a supplementary gloss before the outline can be so filled in as to depict the classic doctrine. "The promise and
the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in
whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the
detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is
wanting" (Wisc. & Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S.379, 386; McGovern v. City of N. Y., 234 N. Y. 377, 389; Walton Water Co. v. Village of
Walton, 238 N. Y. 46, 51; 1 Williston, Contracts, § 139; Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, pp. 82-88). If A promises B to make him a
gift, consideration may be lacking, though B has renounced other opportunities for betterment in the faith that the promise will be kept.
The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another, when constant repetition
brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disre-
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garded or forgotten. The doctrine of consideration has not escaped the
common lot. As far back as 1881, Judge HOLMES in his lectures on the
Common Law (p. 292), separated the detriment which is merely a consequence of the promise from the detriment which is in truth the motive or
inducement, and yet added that the courts "have gone far in obliterating
this distinction." The tendency toward effacement has not lessened with
the years. On the contrary, there has grown up of recent days a doctrine
that a substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requireinents can be found in what is styled "a promissory estoppel" (Williston,
Contracts, §§ 139, 116). Whether the exception has made its way in this
State to such an extent as to permit us to say that the general law of
consideration has been modified accordingly, we do not now attempt to
say. Cases such as Siegel v. Spear & Co. (234 N. Y. 479) and DeCicco v.
Schweizer (221 N. Y. 431) may be signposts on the road. Certain, at least,
it is that we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the
equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions. So long as those decisions stand, the question is not merely
whether the enforcement of a charitable subscription can be squared with
the doctrine of consideration in all its ancient rigor. The question may
also be whether it can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as
qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
We have said that the cases in this State have recognized this exception, if exception it is thought to be. Thus, in Barnes v. Perine (12 N. Y.
18) the subscription was made without request, express or implied, that
the church do anything on the faith of it. Later, the church did incur
expense to the knowledge of the promisor, and in the reasonable belief
that the promise would be kept. We held the promise binding, though
consideration there was none except upon the theory of a promissory
estoppel. In PresbyterianSociety v. Beach (74 N. Y. 72) a situation substantially the same became the basis for a like ruling. So in Roberts v.
Cobb (103 N. Y. 600) and Keuka College v. Ray (167 N. Y. 96) the
moulds of consideration as fixed by the old doctrine were subjected to a
like expansion. Very likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped,
more or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made. Judges have been
affected by the thought that "defences of that character" are "breaches of
faith toward the public, and especially toward those engaged in the same
enterprise, and an unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those interested" (W. F. ALLEN, J., in Barnes v. Perine,
supra, page 24; and cf. Eastern States League v. Vail, 97 Vt. 495, 505, and
cases there cited). The result speaks for itself irrespective of the motive.
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Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so
many considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to
save the symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so
much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and procedure (8 Holdsworth, History of English Law,
7 et seq.). The concept survives as one of the distinctive features of our
legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on the
way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts, however, the
pressure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.
It is in this background of precedent that we are to view the problem
now before us. The background helps to an understanding of the implications inherent in subscription and acceptance. This is so though we may
find in the end that without recourse to the innovation of promissory
estoppel the transaction can be fitted within the mould of consideration
as established by tradition.
The promisor wished to have a memorial to perpetuate her name.
She imposed a condition that the "gift" should "be known as the Mary
Yates Johnston Memorial Fund." The moment that the college accepted
$1,000 as a payment on account, there was an assumption of a duty to do
whatever acts were customary or reasonably necessary to maintain the
memorial fairly and justly in the spirit of its creation. The college could
not accept the money, and hold itself free thereafter from personal responsibility to give effect to the condition (Dinan v. Coneys, 143 N. Y.
544, 547; Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136; Gridley v. Gridley, 24 N. Y. 130;
Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 469; 1 Williston, Contracts, §§ 90,
370). More is involved in the receipt of such a fund than a mere acceptance of money to be held to a corporate use (cf. Martin v. Meles, 179
Mass. 114, citing Johnson v. Otterbein University, 41 Ohio St. 527, 531,
and Presb. Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517). The purpose of the founder
would be unfairly thwarted or at least inadequately served if the college
failed to communicate to the world, or in any event to applicants for the
scholarship, the title of the memorial. By implication it undertook, when
it accepted a portion of the "gift," that in its circulars of information and
in other customary ways, when making announcement of this scholarship, it would couple with the announcement the name of the donor. The
donor was not at liberty to gain the benefit of such an undertaking upon
the payment of a part and disappoint the expectation that there would be
payment of the residue. If the college had stated after receiving $1,000
upon account of the subscription that it would apply the money to the
prescribed use, but that in its circulars of information and when respond-
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ing to prospective applicants it would deal with the fund as an anonymous donation, there is little doubt that the subscriber would have been
at liberty to treat this statement as the repudiation of a duty impliedly
assumed, a repudiation justifying a refusal to make payments in the future. Obligation in such circumstances is correlative and mutual. A case
much in point is N. J. Hospital v. Wright (95 N. J. L. 462, 464), where a
subscription for the maintenance of a bed in a hospital was held to be
enforcible by virtue of an implied promise by the hospital that the bed
should be maintained in the name of the subscriber (cf. Bd. of Foreign
Missions v. Smith, 209 Penn. St. 361). A parallel situation might arise
upon the endowment of a chair or a fellowship in a university by the aid
of annual payments with the condition that it should commemorate the
name of the founder or that of a member of his family. The university
would fail to live up to the fair meaning of its promise if it were to publish in its circulars of information and elsewhere the existence of a chair
or a fellowship in the prescribed subject, and omit the benefactor's name.
A duty to act in ways beneficial to the promisor and beyond the application of the fund to the mere uses of the trust would be cast upon the
promisee by the acceptance of the money. We do not need to measure the
extent either of benefit to the promisor or of detriment to the promisee
implicit in this duty. "If a person chooses to make an extravagant promise for an inadequate consideration it is his own affair" (8 Holdsworth,
History of English Law, p. 17). It was long ago said that "when a thing is
to be done by the plaintiff, be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action" (Sturlyn v. Albany, 1587, Cro. Eliz. 67,
quoted by Holdsworth, supra; cf. Walton Water Co. v. Village of Walton,
238 N. Y. 46, 51). The longing for posthumous remembrance is an emotion not so weak as to justify us in saying that its gratification is a negligible good.
We think the duty assumed by the plaintiff to perpetuate the name
of the founder of the memorial is sufficient in itself to give validity to the
subscription within the rules that define consideration for a promise of
that order. When the promisee subjected itself to such a duty at the implied request of the promisor, the result was the creation of a bilateral
agreement (Williston, Contracts, §§ 60-a, 68, 90, 370; Brown v. Knapp,
supra; Grossman v. Schenker, supra; Williams College v. Danforth, 12
Pick. 541, 544; Ladies Collegiate Inst. v. French, 16 Gray, 196, 200).
There was a promise on the one side and on the other a return promise,
made, it is true, by implication, but expressing an obligation that had
been exacted as a condition of the payment. A bilateral agreement may

1987]

ALLEGHENY COLLEGE

exist though one of the mutual promises be a promise "implied in fact,"
an inference from conduct as opposed to an inference from words (Williston, Contracts, §§ 90, 22-a; Pettibonev. Moore, 75 Hun, 461, 464). We
think the fair inference to be drawn from the acceptance of a payment on
account of the subscription is a promise by the college to do what may be
necessary on its part to make the scholarship effective. The plan conceived by the subscriber will be mutilated and distorted unless the sum to
be accepted is adequate to the end in view. Moreover, the time to affix
her name to the memorial will not arrive until the entire fund has been
collected. The college may thus thwart the purpose of the payment on
account if at liberty to reject a tender of the residue. It is no answer to
say that a duty would then arise to make restitution of the money. If such
a duty may be imposed, the only reason for its existence must be that
there is then a failure of "consideration." To say that there is a failure of
consideration is to concede that a consideration has been promised since
otherwise it could not fail. No doubt there are times and situations in
which limitations laid upon a promisee in connection with the use of
what is paid by a subscriber lack the quality of a consideration, and are
to be classed merely as conditions (Williston, Contracts, § 112; Page,
Contracts, § 523). "It is often difficult to determine whether words of
condition in a promise indicate a request for consideration or state a
mere condition in a gratuitous promise. An aid, though not a conclusive
test in determining which construction of the promise is more reasonable
is an inquiry whether the happening of the condition will be a benefit to
the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that the happening was requested
as a consideration" (Williston, supra, § 112). Such must be the meaning
of this transaction unless we are prepared to hold that the college may
keep the payment on account, and thereafter nullify the scholarship
which is to preserve the memory of the subscriber. The fair implication
to be gathered from the whole transaction is assent to the condition and
the assumption of a duty to go forward with performance (DeWolf Co. v.
Harvey, 161 Wis. 535; Pullman Co. v. Meyer, 195 Ala. 397, 401; Braniff
v. Bater, 101 Kan. 117; cf. Corbin, Offer & Acceptance, 26 Yale L. J.
169, 177, 193; McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv. L. R. 644; Sir
Frederick Pollock, 28 L. Q. R. 100, 101). The subscriber does not say: I
hand you $1,000, and you may make up your mind later, after my death,
whether you will undertake to commemorate my name. What she says in
effect is this: I hand you $1,000, and if you are unwilling to commemorate me, the time to speak is now.
The conclusion thus reached makes it needless to consider whether,
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aside from the feature of a memorial, a promissory estoppel may result
from the assumption of a duty to apply the fund, so far as already paid,
to special purposes not mandatory under the provisions of the college
charter (the support and education of students preparing for the ministry), an assumption induced by the belief that other payments sufficient
in amount to make the scholarship effective would be added to the fund
thereafter upon the death of the subscriber (Ladies Collegiate Inst. v.
French, 16 Gray, 196; Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18, and cases there
cited).
The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term
should be reversed, and judgment ordered for the plaintiff as prayed for
in the complaint, with costs in all courts.
KELLOGG, J. (dissenting). The Chief Judge finds in the expression
"In loving memory this gift shall be known as the Mary Yates Johnston
Memorial Fund" an offer on the part of Mary Yates Johnston to contract
with Allegheny College. The expression makes no such appeal to me.
Allegheny College was not requested to perform any act through which
the sum offered might bear the title by which the offeror states that it
shall be known. The sum offered was termed a "gift" by the offeror. Consequently, I can see no reason why we should strain ourselves to make it,
not a gift, but a trade. Moreover, since the donor specified that the gift
was made "In consideration of my interest in Christian education, and in
consideration of others subscribing," considerations not adequate in law,
I can see no excuse for asserting that it was otherwise made in consideration of an act or promise on the part of the donee, constituting a sufficient quid quo pro to convert the gift into a contract obligation. To me
the words used merely expressed an expectation or wish on the part of
the donor and failed to exact the return of an adequate consideration.
But if an offer indeed was present, then clearly it was an offer to enter
into a unilateral contract. The offeror was to be bound provided the offeree performed such acts as might be necessary to make the gift offered
become known under the proposed name. This is evidently the thought
of the Chief Judge, for he says: "She imposed a condition that the 'gift'
should be known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund." In other
words, she proposed to exchange her offer of a donation in return for acts
to be performed. Even so there was never any acceptance of the offer and,
therefore, no contract, for the acts requested have never been performed.
The gift has never been made known as demanded. Indeed, the requested
acts, under the very terms of the assumed offer, could never have been
performed at a time to convert the offer into a promise. This is so for the
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reason that the donation was not to take effect until after the death of the
donor, and by her death her offer was withdrawn. (Williston on Contracts, see. 62.) Clearly, although a promise of the college to make the
gift known, as requested, may be implied, that promise was not the acceptance of an offer which gave rise to a contract. The donor stipulated
for acts, not promises. "In order to make a bargain it is necessary that
the acceptor shall give in return for the offer or the promise exactly the
consideration which the offeror requests. If an act is requested, that very
act and no other must be given. If a promise is requested, that promise
must be made absolutely and unqualifiedly." (Williston on Contracts,
sec. 73.) "It does not follow that an offer becomes a promise because it is
accepted; it may be, and frequently is, conditional, and then it does not
become a promise until the conditions are satisfied; and in case of offers
for a consideration, the performance of the consideration is always
deemed a condition." (Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec.
4.) It seems clear to me that there was here no offer, no acceptance of an
offer, and no contract. Neither do I agree with the Chief Judge that this
court "found consideration present where the general law of contract, at
least as then declared, would have said that it was absent" in the cases of
Barnes v. Perine (12 N. Y. 18), PresbyterianSociety v. Beach (74 N. Y.
72) and Keuka College v. Ray (167 N. Y. 96). In the Keuka College case
an offer to contract, in consideration of the performance of certain acts
by the offeree, was converted into a promise by the actual performance of
those acts. This form of contract has been known to the law from time
immemorial (Langdell, sec. 46) and for at least a century longer than the
other type, a bilateral contract. (Williston, sec. 13.) It may be that the
basis of the decisions in Barnes v. Perine and Presbyterian Society v.
Beach (supra)was the same as in the Keuka College case. (See Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517.) However, even if the
basis of the decisions be a so-called "promissory estoppel," nevertheless
they initiated no new doctrine. A so-called "promissory estoppel,"

although not so termed, was held sufficient by LORD

MANSFIELD

and his

fellow judges as far back as the year 1765. (Pillansv. Van Mierop, 3 Burr.
1663.) Such a doctrine may be an anomaly; it is not a novelty. Therefore,
I can see no ground for the suggestion that the ancient rule which makes
consideration necessary to the formation of every contract is in danger of
effacement through any decisions of this court. To me that is a cause for
gratulation rather than regret. However, the discussion may be beside the
mark, for I do not understand that the holding about to be made in this
case is other than a holding that consideration was given to convert the
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offer into a promise. With that result I cannot agree and, accordingly,
must dissent.
POUND, CRANE, LEHMAN and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur with CARDOZO, Ch. J.; KELLOGG, J. dissents in opinion, in which ANDREWS, J.,
concurs. Judgment accordingly.
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APPENDIX II
EXCERPTS FROM ROBERT JACKSON'S BRIEF FOR THE
RESPONDENT

A.
Efforts to classify this cross between evangelism and legalism fail.
It is not a PLEDGE in the legal sense of a deposit or delivery of
property as security. It is a pledge only in the evangelical sense of an
unctuous and ceremonial, but unenforceable resolve in the present to do
good in the future- and as usual the more unction the less resolve.
B.
The picture drawn... of the College turning down the pious ambitions of youth who have come to it, relying on this gift, looks a little
foolish in view of the frank and practical testimony of the Treasurer that
the fund has never been established for"We could not establish the fund and have students coming
expecting to receive from it until we had it."
(Dr. Miles, Folio 251)
So the Court will be relieved to know that the grieving waiting line
is simply the creation of imagination, and that the management of the
College is treating the situation in an honest, practical and commendable
manner that the [Appellant's] Brief would not indicate.
The law of New York condemns all mental flip flops by the Courts
in the aid of charity. It is clear though inelastic; honest though rigid.
Counsel is, of course, able to cite foreign cases to sustain his argument. In fact, we have found some stronger for him than those he cites.
On no subject do we find greater confusion and lack of intellectual integrity among our sister states.
C.
No Common Law Court, to our knowledge, has yet held the contract of Charitable Subscriptions Sui Generis and not requiring
consideration.
Those states which depart from the law of England and New York
and Massachusetts do so either by declaring an estoppel to question the
subscription after expense has been incurred or buildings built or obligations incurred in reliance thereon or they have done lip service to the
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doctrine of consideration and then invented fictitious, devious or technical considerations, only adding to the difficulty of the general doctrine.
Such inventions as "implied requests" and assumed compliance therewith, making a meritorious object itself supply the consideration, and
other judicial dodges, promise to keep the subject in confusion.
Massachusetts, like New York, makes no gestures for effect ....
Out where they dilute the common law with populism the Courts
have often gone so far as to find mere taking a consideration for paying.-Logic that would sustain burglary as a common law contract.
D.
Certainly if this Court is to retain the doctrine of consideration as a
test of contractual obligation, it should not invite contempt by asserting
the premise and then resorting to an evasion of the conclusion. The trial
court considered and rejected the argument to do so, saying it would be
straining too hard to find a legal consideration for what was intended as a
gift.
E.
If the doctrine is to be retained at all there is no reason why the clear
and rugged path already marked out should not be followed even though
it be a rough one for the coercive charities that thrive by drive. The
Court has not in the past, and probably will not now, invent fictitious
considerations that invite the contempt of those who hope to see the law
an honest, if not an exact science.
The Appellant quotes Dean Pounds' version of the dialogue between
the Doctor and Student. This is one of the many cases in which the Common Law, passing through the lens of Dean Pound acquires more of
color than of light.
F.
The whole aspect of the transaction forbids any conclusion that testatrix intended to assume a legal obligation by the agreement in suit.
The printed form was supplied by the plaintiff and must be interpreted against it. The document seems carefully devised to induce execution rather than to force collection.
It does not style itself "contract" or "promissory note". Many a
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cautious widow would shy at that! "Estate Pledge", seductive creature of
the lay mind-suggestive of futurity and moral duty-not a suggestion of
establishing creditor and debtor relationship or an unalterable obligation.
The only suggestion of contract about it is the effort to recite for her a
consideration-In that they used recitals more persuasive to signing than
collecting. "Interest in Christian Education"-To this recital could be
urged all the good things in both the real and the hypothetical worlds.
"Subscription of others"-Here the social pressure of not being outdone
in virtue by others would impress any prospective drivee. Certainly it is
not too much to expect that those who conduct "intensive drives" to
convert the charitable tendencies and religious impulses of elderly women into bills receivable should do so by language plainly conveying to
the driven one the effect of her act.
This instrument is not a bargain; it is a gift; not creating a creditor
but a beneficiary. It is of testamentary character. It is gotten up to lead
the testatrix to believe that she was giving the College participation in
her estate as a legatee, to crystalize so far as possible the intention to
make a gift and to interpose moral obstacles to reconsideration in the
calm that follows drives.
It is an "Estate Pledge". The "obligation" is not due until thirty
days after death. The Executor or Administrator is directed to pay it and
it is subject to all provisions of her Will then extant. It is witnessed after
the manner of a Will and creates an obligation of the character of a legacy, not a debt. She contemplated giving the College $5,000 out of her
net estate-not giving them a creditor's claim for $5,000. Moreover their
gift after death was not to supersede but to follow the gifts to her family.

